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ABSTRACT 
Corruption is suggested to have a negative impact on productivity and thus 
growth.  Several studies have studied the relationship closely, including Hall and Jones 
(1999) and Lambsdorff (2003).  This paper seeks to build on their foundation and specify 
a new and robust model by looking at the effect of corruption controls on total factor 
productivity through a two-stage least squares regression.  Since it is through public 
institutions that corruption manifests, also examined are differences between ‘inclusive’ 
and ‘extractive’ institutions.  Also important is the degree to which a state is centralized.  
Extraction by way of corrupt institutions differs in highly centralized states and highly 
disordered states.  It is through this framework that the relationship between productivity 
and corruption is analyzed. 
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 “I do not pretend to understand the moral universe; the arc is a long one, 
my eye reaches but little ways; I cannot calculate the curve and complete 
the figure by the experience of sight; I can divine it by conscience.  And 
from what I see I am sure it bends towards justice.”  
– Theodore Parker  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to describe the significance, strength, and direction 
of the relationship between effective corruption controls and aggregate productivity.  
Previous research has found evidence that economies able to effectively control 
corruption are more productive (Lambsdorff 2003, Hall and Jones 1999).  This paper 
seeks to build on their foundation and introduce a new model to examine current data 
over a longer period with a considerably larger sample in the hopes of establishing a 
more robust relationship.  
Productivity is the measure of how much output an economy can produce with a 
given set of labor and capital inputs.  It is a measure of efficiency.  Levels of productivity 
and wealth vary greatly between nations and have been on divergent paths since the late 
18th century, as in Graph 1.  This paper looks at how the control of corruption might play 
a significant role in such divergence.  If corruption is controlled, market access is 
unrestricted, property rights are secure, and transaction costs are predictable.  Workers 
and firms in nations with weak corruption controls are less willing to take risks, as 
corruption limits market access, weakens property rights, and increases uncertainty, thus 
eroding work incentives.  It follows that workers produce less with the inputs at their 
disposal if working harder has no rewards.  Weak property rights, a telltale sign of 
 
 
 2 
corrupt governments, discourage investment in new ideas.  Firms face higher business 
costs. Bribes increase the cost of new projects.  If permits can only be purchased with an 
expensive bribe, it’s difficult for firms to enter new markets.  Poor or low-quality 
infrastructure raises transportation costs.  The idea that corruption levels affect 
productivity and output is called the institutions hypothesis.  
Graph 1: The Great Divergence1 
  
The institutions hypothesis is the focus of the research presented.  It states that 
governing institutions, and any endemic corruption, are significant determinants of 
aggregate productivity and output.  It is these institutions, themselves agents of the 
government, that have the authority to decide terms of trade, pass laws, issue permits, 
extract tax revenue, and provide a means of legal recourse.  They siphon resources from 
                                                
1 Courtesy of The Atlantic 
 
 
 3 
the market and enact entry barriers, increasing the cost of doing business and reducing 
competition.  Corrupt officials in institutions like the judiciary, constabulary, or 
regulatory agencies use their position to extract bribe money, enforce monopolies, 
expropriate land, or otherwise divert the flow of resources once destined for the 
marketplace.  They ration permits and market access, increasing costs for firms.  Supply 
falls and prices rise (see Graph 4).  There is little motivation to produce, create, or pursue 
education if there are no rewards for doing so.  Institutions in less productive nations are 
more corrupt, as visible in Graph 2.  
Graph 2: National economies by productivity and corruption controls, 2011. 
 
Conversely, institutions in highly productive nations are more inclusive and 
assure a level playing field for economic actors.  Inclusive institutions act as facilitators 
by establishing a competitive marketplace through the enforcement of property rights.  
People and firms are incentivized to take risks and explore new markets.  Strong public 
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 4 
services, like comprehensive education and an unbiased legal system, empower would-be 
entrepreneurs, inventors, and academics. 
There is another hypothesis that offers additional insight on the productivity gap 
between nations.  The geography hypothesis predicts that productivity and growth are 
largely determined by geographic variables like rainfall, latitude, and temperature.  
Nations that are ‘lucky’ enough to have good natural resource endowments, enough water 
and land to grow crops, seasonal weather patterns, and access to coastal waters are 
expected to be wealthier and more productive.  The geographic hypothesis has been 
advocated by Diamond (1997); Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999); and Sachs (2001, 
2003).  The model proposed in this paper uses a multiple regression analysis to parse out 
the effect different variables have on productivity, so it is an easy matter to control for 
geographic variables. 
The following sections provide the framework for the new model presented in this 
paper.  Section II defines productivity in the context of the new model and elaborates on 
the theoretical determinants.  Section III is a detailed look at how institutions evolved, so 
to more fully understand their impact on aggregate wealth differences and thus inform the 
new model.  Section IV looks at natural experiments and case studies.  Sections V and VI 
describe the models of previous papers and the one presented here, respectively.  The 
paper ends with an analysis of the regression results.  Regression tables, variable 
summaries, and other additional data are included in the Appendix. 
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II. PRODUCTIVITY 
Productivity is a measure of how efficient an economy is with its current capital 
stock and labor force.  This includes, but is not limited to, technology levels, governance, 
and weather (Syverson 2011).  Productive economies can produce more output without 
necessarily increasing the number of inputs.  Workers are more efficient with the 
resources they already possess.  The measure of productivity used in the new model 
captures aggregate productivity, allowing for comparison between national economies.  
This is accomplished with a simple Cobb-Douglas production function that interacts 
productivity (A) with capital (K), labor (L), and human capital (H) to produce output (Y) 
in the following form2: 𝑌 =   𝐴(𝐾!𝐻𝐿 !!! )  
 
All variables can be sampled, except for the unobservable measure of aggregate 
productivity, or total factor productivity (tfp). 
 𝐺𝐷𝑃!   = (𝑡𝑓𝑝)[(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘!)!(𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙!) 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒! !!! ] 
 
Now it is possible back out a measure of productivity consistent across all observations. 
 
𝑡𝑓𝑝! = 𝐺𝐷𝑃!(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘!)!(𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒!)(𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙!)(!!!) 
                                                
2 Measures of GDP and labor come from the World Bank, capital stock and human capital come from the Penn World Table. 
 
 
 6 
The function says that no matter how much capital and labor an economy can 
deploy, it is still dependent on other factors that influence the effectiveness of either 
input.  This paper operates under the assumption that α = .35.  An alternative calculation 
of tfp (tfpalt) where α = .3, is also suggested to accurately capture capital share of output, 
and will be analyzed in Section VII. 
Graph 3 establishes a baseline for looking at how changes in productivity affect 
economic potential through the Solow model.  Output is given by the aforementioned 
production function, where human capital is included as part of labor (L).  An increase in 
productivity from A’ to A’’ shifts the output curve upward from the purple to the blue 
line.  In an economy with a set capital stock K’ and a fixed labor supply, the productivity 
boost increases aggregate output by ΔY’.  The economic potential (Y*) at the steady-state 
increases proportionally more, by ΔY*, since the increased investment (Δ𝑠  Y’) allows for 
more accumulation of capital, given the constant rate of depreciation (𝑑Y).  At any level 
of capital stock, labor, depreciation, and savings, any increase in productivity will 
increase output.  The less productive economy (purple function) will reach a steady state 
(K*) at a lower level of output.  Increases in productivity change the maximum amount of 
deployable capital, indefinitely postponing a steady-state equilibrium.  
So what caused productivity to increase so rapidly in those specific 18th century 
economies?  Many variables that are theorized to affect productivity like natural resource 
endowment and climate are exogenous, given, and cannot be changed by policy or 
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government intervention.  To account for changes in productivity, it is necessary to 
identify other components that are more flexible.3 
Graph 3: Solow model 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Please note that in the model presented in this paper human capital is used in the productivity (tfp) calculation as a weighting for the 
labor force.  Changes in human capital do affect productivity, but only in calculating the tfp value.  For this paper productivity is a 
measurement of how effectively the available labor force, as weighted by their human capital, utilizes the capital stock. 
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TECHNOLOGY 
First let us discuss technology as one of these determinants.  Technology certainly 
increases productivity, but a nation is not endowed with a specific number of 
technologies.  Technology disseminates.  Humans are industrious creatures and if 
provided with technology that begets additional utility or profit, like a new innovation, 
adoption soon follows.   
Technology flows downhill between countries.  Given the right incentives any 
technology widely utilized in one country will have little difficulty hopping borders.  This 
diffusion has certainly accelerated because of the Internet.  The delay in technology 
diffusion has certainly diminished.  Just Google it!  But while access to advanced 
technology can certainly increase efficiency, there is no guarantee of widespread 
adoption in countries where private property rights are weak.  If corrupt authorities 
appropriate much profit and income, returns on investments are uncertain and work is de-
incentivized.  New technology becomes less appealing.  Why buy expensive new 
machines when the risk of appropriation is high?  Concurrently, the ruling elites have 
strong incentives to make procurement of new technologies difficult where it could 
threaten their political or business interests.  The printing press, for example, was 
outlawed in the Ottoman Empire for its first 250 years because literacy was seen as a 
potential threat to the sultan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
GEOGRAPHY HYPOTHESIS 
An alternative, or perhaps additional, explanation for the productivity disparity is 
that geographic variables have had a profound effect on productivity and output. 
Diamond (1997) traces the effect of resource endowment through early human 
development in the hope of explaining the great disparity between wealthy and poor 
states.  His thesis begins deep in prehistory, around the Neolithic Revolution circa 10,000 
BCE.  Hunters and gatherers in certain parts of the world were better able to make the 
transition to sedentary life due to abundance of domesticable flora and fauna.  This led to 
some regions like Europe, China, and the Middle East to begin accumulating capital at an 
earlier moment while populations in other regions like the Americas and Polynesia were 
still itinerant.  Denizens of early settlements could now collect and store things that 
previously would have been impossible.  With stores and surpluses came trade. 
Diamond suggests that another key ingredient of the geographic hypothesis is 
continental alignment.  Continents with a latitudinal axis (Eurasia) had broad climate 
zones that encouraged dissemination of agriculture, writing, and other technologies.  
Continents along a longitudinal axis (Africa, the Americas) had many more geographic 
and climate hurdles.  Gallup et al. (1999) find that economic growth is likely related to 
location and climate through disease burdens, agricultural productivity, and 
transportation costs.  Tropical climates are full of disease and difficult soil.  Bloom and 
Sachs (1998) suggest that landlocked countries are also at a disadvantage.  Populations 
isolated from water trade are handicapped, as they must pay higher transportation costs in 
getting goods from or to international markets.   
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 Natural resource endowments factor into this conversation, as they too are 
completely exogenous.  Resource abundance, in theory, should increase the wealth of any 
nation.  But other studies have found that is not necessarily the case (Sachs and Warner 
2001).  Both Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2013) and Leite and Weidmann (1999) 
found that natural resources are eminently exploitable by rent-seeking officials, 
especially in highly centralized bureaucracies.  Corrupt officials gobble up the wealth 
otherwise destined for the greater market.  Both studies found that open governance and 
strong, inclusive, and adaptable institutions are key to reaping the full economic benefits 
of resource exploitation.   
 
INSTITUTIONS  
Institutions are a different beast altogether.  Effective, inclusive institutions offer 
secure property rights that protect against predation by public or private agents.  They 
provide the underlying framework upon which people base their decisions.  The body of 
literature uses a number of different terms to identify the channel through which 
corruption manifests itself in real terms.  North (1991) identifies corruption as 
manifesting through institutions, which are defined as “…the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction.  They consist of both 
informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and 
formal rules (constitutions, laws, and property rights).  Throughout history, institutions 
have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange.”  
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2012) distinguish between inclusive institutions, where 
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property rights are secure, and extractive institutions, where investment and development 
is obstructed by the threat of expropriation at the hands of a small ruling elite.  Hall and 
Jones (1999) identify corruption as a diversion of resources through social infrastructure. 
In their words,  
“A social infrastructure favorable to high levels of output per worker provides an 
environment that supports productive activities and encourages capital 
accumulation, skill acquisition, invention and technology transfer.  Such a social 
infrastructure gets the prices right so that, in the language of North and Thomas 
(1973), individuals capture the social returns to their actions as private returns.  
Social institutions to protect the output of individual productive units from 
diversion are an essential component of a social infrastructure favorable to high 
levels of output per worker.” 
 
Corruption doesn’t, however, manifest uniformly.  Populations under weak 
central governments suffer extraction independent of any central authority.  Local 
authorities are unconstrained in corrupt practices.  At the other extreme, highly 
centralized autocracies closely manage institutions so to extract the maximum total 
wealth (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  Cheung (1998) identified the same pattern of 
centralized and decentralized corruption as ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up,’ respectively.   
The ruling elite, strongmen, or dons, who use the bureaucracy to extract rents in a 
controlled way, as in an autocracy or in organized crime, mandate top-down corruption. 
Here, public servants often act as middle men with bribe money going directly to the 
central authority.  In return they receive kickbacks.  Extraction that is constrained this 
way does not inhibit the economy as strongly, since it is much more predictable (Bardhan 
1997).  When workers and firms know with certainty what bribes need to be paid, how 
much, and to whom, they face less risk and are better able to plan ahead.  The extra risk 
and high permit prices faced by new firms still leads to fewer in the marketplace, but 
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there is also the (relative) certainty that unexpected bribes will not be ‘levied,’ 
threatening the supply of future income.  In this way an economy can still grow and 
maintain a level of productivity relatively higher than could otherwise be reached in a 
disordered state.  
Where top-down corruption ensures a steady flow of income to the rulers, bottom-
up corruption is a free-for-all with each agent extracting as much as possible.  When there 
is an absence of centralized government, officials are free to demand bribes as often as 
they like.  Bottom-up corruption begins with low level bribes, portions of which are used 
to pay off higher-level officials, all acting in their own self-interests.  Bribes must now be 
paid to most officials.  The amount is inconstant without a central authority able to 
control extraction.  Workers and firms face massive uncertainty when regional 
administrators are independent.   
Disordered corruption has a much stronger effect on growth and productivity, as 
property rights are unenforceable and the risk of unexpected extraction skyrockets.  With 
so many potential bribes to pay and without secure property rights to offer legal 
recompense, transaction costs skyrocket and output plummets.  If the payoff is more 
uncertain, people are less likely to risk what they have on the hope of higher future 
returns.  A corruption burden de-incentivizes the labor force from engaging in risky 
behavior.  In such a hostile business environment there is little room for growth and 
expansion.  Wei (1997) found that an increase in corruption-induced uncertainty from the 
level of Singapore to that of Mexico is the equivalent of a 32% tax hike on multinational 
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firms.  Other forms of corruption manifest in government contracts, such as over-
charging for inferior products. 
In both forms of extraction the economic effects are similar: every time an official 
must be paid to continue business operations, the marginal cost of doing business 
increases.  There is less revenue, and thus less profit.  In some ways corruption resembles 
a tax.  Unlike a tax, however, the bribe revenue is not put towards the purchase of 
infrastructure, capital, welfare programs, or defense (Wei 1997) and is instead spent by 
elites on private goods.  
Graph 4: bribe price-permit quantity tradeoff 
 
Waller et al. (2002) document the trade off between the level of bribes and the 
quantity of permits available, as shown in Graph 4.  As bribe prices increase, the quantity 
of permits falls.  Under coordinated extraction, as with an authoritarian regime, the 
autocrat sets bribe levels (𝐵!) to maximize revenues.  In a decentralized economy, bribes 
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are set very high (𝐵!) so to maximize revenue for each corrupt official.  Because these 
officials are not acting in unison, bribe demand jumps and the number of permits 
demanded plummets (𝑄!).  The most permits are available at the inclusive equilibrium 
(𝑄!) where no bribes are necessary to access markets.  Movement away from disorder and 
towards inclusion increases the number of permits available in the economy, spurring 
innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Djankov el al (2003) created a theoretical framework that establishes the 
relationship between institutions of different quality and social welfare loss.  The model 
identifies a trade-off between disorder and dictatorship.  As a government decentralizes, 
disorder must increase.  Weak states need stronger central governments to control corrupt 
agents.  Djankov defines disorder as “the risk to individuals and their property of private 
expropriation in such forms as banditry, murder, theft, violation of agreements, torts, or 
monopoly pricing…[Disorder] is also reflected in the private subversion of public 
institutions, such as courts, through bribes and threats, which allows private violators to 
escape penalties.”  Alternatively, dictatorship is the use of the central state to restrict 
entry into industries, extract resources, and otherwise violate property rights.  Corruption, 
then, is highest in regimes where there is no central government or where the central 
government is all-powerful.   
Graph 5 is based on the one published by Djankov et al. (2003).  It has been 
modified to allow for the important distinction that social loss under a dictatorship are 
less than in a disordered state.  The authors used these two extremes and their associated 
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Graph 5: Institutional Possibility Frontier 
 
social losses to define the tradeoff between disorder (a privately-run nation) and 
dictatorship (a state-run nation), with an equilibrium where loss, the appropriation of 
resources by authorities, is minimized.  Since a government must levy taxes to fund the 
institutions that ensure honest exchange, there is no way to reach any equilibrium without 
social losses.   
The institutional possibility frontier (IPF) represents all possible institutional 
outcomes of any given economy.  As disorder increases, so does extraction from officials 
no longer constrained by central authorities.  This situation is endemic in many sub-
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Saharan African nations.  Conversely, states that are highly centralized also experience 
loss as authoritative governments tightly control economic activity.  Communist nations, 
present and past, are associated with of this type of extraction.  The point of tangency, 
where social losses are minimized, falls somewhere in between.   
It is important to note that the point of tangency, while the optimal loss-
minimizing equilibrium, is not the only equilibrium available to institutions since the 
countervailing forces of corruption can drive institutions toward the extremes of 
dictatorship or disorder.  Corrupt officials lose income when corruption is controlled.  It 
is in their best interests to maintain the status quo.  Equilibrium under extractive regimes 
is reached when powerful elites resist institutional change that might undermine their 
influence or income (North 1990, Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2001).  
What mechanism, then, allows economies to reach an inclusive equilibrium?  In a 
democracy citizens have the ability to remove officials acting in their self-interests.  
Institutions move away from extremes.  The democratic process distributes power away 
from a central authority, checking the personal ambitions of elites, politicians, strongmen, 
and corrupt bureaucrats.  Inclusive economies are by and large more productive, as 
observable in Graph 6.  But in countries where this mechanism is absent, ruling elites 
have no checks on their power and will structure institutions to serve their political and 
economic self-interests.  Movement along the IPF, and from one equilibrium to another, 
is highly dependent on the control of corruption, itself a result of the democratic process.   
It is then expected that economies suffering from high levels of corruption are less 
productive.  Also important is that the corruption control indexes used in this paper’s 
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model do not distinguish between top-down and bottom-up extraction.  To fit the IPF 
model to the data, corruption must be thought of as levels of social loss.  The greater the 
corruption, the greater the amount of social loss.  Thus movement along the IPF 
represents changes in institutions.  To examine how the economic potential of countries 
with extractive regimes differs from those with inclusive institutions, let us return to the 
Solow model presented earlier.  
Graph 6: Solow with economies of different corruption levels 
 
Graph 6 juxtaposes economic potential (both current, Y’, and future, Y*) in 
extractive nations (red, economy a) and inclusive institutions (blue, economy b).  If both 
nations are otherwise identical in capital stock, labor, depreciation, and savings rate, the 
inclusive economy will always be wealthier.  Greater levels of investment in the blue 
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economy permit a greater accumulation of capital (Kb*-Ka*), and therefore a greater 
steady-state output.  Ya* is the maximum future output in economy a, whereas Yb* 
represents the economic potential in economy b.  The blue steady-state economy will 
produce Yb*-Ya* more than the red steady-state economy.  
There is a great variety of institutional quality in juxtaposition to earlier eras 
where inclusive institutions were rare or non-existent.  Institutions can change and 
evolve.  Such movement, toward or away from the optimal institution set, is known as 
institutional drift.  So where many economies are rife with corrupt institutions, a large 
number have shown an ability and willingness control corruption.  Early attempts at 
inclusion, however, weren’t always successful.  Movement away from extraction didn’t 
begin in earnest until the Late Middle Ages and Early Renaissance.  It is of interest to 
point out the mechanisms that cause this shift as it can help shed light on the determinants 
of corruption and productivity.  To explore how this might happen, we examine how 
institutions first developed in the Natufian and Neolithic cultures.  The next section 
documents the events leading to the eventual control of corruption in many states.  
 
III. INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION 
In his seminal paper on how institutions affect economic stability and change, 
North (1991) points out that the fundamental purpose of institutions is to create order and 
reduce uncertainty, as they “define the set choice, determine transaction and production 
cost, and the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity.”  They 
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establish the rules of the game.  Constraints (rules) on economic activity depend not only 
the laws passed by governments, but on customs, traditions, and moral imperatives. 
In early human prehistory, it was solely these customs, traditions, and moral 
imperatives that governed economic interaction.  When humans still hunted and foraged 
in wandering bands, economic interaction was constrained to a tight social circle.  
Everyone knew everyone else.  The consequences of harming another member of your 
group (economically or physically) were severe.  Interactions were policed by social 
considerations (Sahlins 1965), the de facto institutions.  
Over several thousand years these groups eventually became sedentary, first 
forming permanent and complex settlements in the Fertile Crescent region of the Middle 
East.  The climate and abundance of domesticable plant and animal species in the region 
drove the transition to agrarian life.  The earliest groups that left the nomadic lifestyle 
were of the Natufian culture, spanned the Levant in the 3,000 years leading up to the 
Neolithic Revolution in 10,000 BCE.  The Natufians were the forbearers of agrarian 
civilization; they were the first hunters-gatherers become sedentary.  Another defining 
feature of the Natufian period was the variety of stone tools.  Among the microliths, or 
chipped-stone tools and weapons, are agricultural tools like sickle blades and grinding 
stones.  This is the first evidence anywhere that cereals were gathered in quantities large 
enough to offset the need to follow migrating herds (Simmons 2007).  But farming was 
not yet a way of life.  It wasn’t until the following epoch, the Neolithic Revolution, that 
the transition to agrarian life truly began.  
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The primary differences between wanderers and settlers are less in how they 
acquired food and more in how each subsequent generation was able to build on the labor 
and innovations of previous generations.  A growing capital stock increased potential 
output.  There was no accumulation of goods in wandering bands; a person needed to 
carry all belongings.  Hunters and gatherers may have eaten better diets and had more 
leisure time, but they were unable to create an economy of any real scale (Sahlins 1972).  
In settlements each generation was able to build on what previous generations left behind, 
giving them momentum.  Nascent economies were encouraged by the simple drive to 
improve life, as is evident from improving dental health and cultivation techniques. 
Technology advancement in early settlements allowed for more efficient use of 
available resources.  Early inhabitants heated clay balls upon which food could be cooked 
(Hodder 2006).  As pottery became available, cooking techniques evolve.  A clay pot was 
a much more practical way of preparing food.  Sickles appear in the archeological record, 
improving the efficiency with which food can be harvested.  With this investment came 
constant production to reap the financial rewards of the initial investment.  Labor markets 
began to specialize.  Increased output permitted population growth. 
Turning to agriculture as a food base radically altered the economic condition of 
early peoples.  Settlements increased the size of social groups.  The larger the settlement, 
the less intertwined were its inhabitants.  As regional density grew so did interaction 
between settlements.  This expanded the trade possibilities horizon and decreasing the 
personal nature of economic interactions (Sabloff and Lamberg-Karlovsky 1975). 
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As the Neolithic Revolution gained momentum, trade between disparate groups 
becomes apparent.  A clear example of this is the early obsidian trade.  Obsidian, a strong 
volcanic glass with diverse uses, has a site-specific geological marker.  Each piece can be 
traced to its origin.  Through examining archeological data it was found that obsidian 
mined in the early settlement of Çatalhöyük in southeast Turkey, circa 7,400 BCE, made 
its way throughout Anatolia, the Levant, and even Cyprus.  At least fifty distinct types of 
obsidian tools were identified at Çatalhöyük, signifying the importance and value to early 
laborers.  In exchange, residents received shells from the Mediterranean and flint from 
the Levant (Lamberg-Karlovsky and Sabloff 1979).  A regional trade network was 
apparent early in prehistory. 
As trade expanded, so did the risk of conflict.  The social networks that enforced 
codes of conduct were no longer sufficient.  A different means of regulating exchange 
was needed.  Shipments had to be protected.  Standardized weights were needed, as were 
legal systems to enforce trade law (North 1991).  Institutions stepped in to fill the gap. 
Institutions also make construction of public works possible.  They are able to 
divert resources to large-scale infrastructure projects.  The earliest known example of a 
public works comes from Jericho, today considered the oldest inhabited city in the world.  
Jericho began as a collection of mud-brick structures.  By 7,350 BCE an estimated 2,000 
people inhabited the village.  One of Jericho’s most fascinating features is a wall 
enclosing the community and a tower.  The tower appears to have been a ceremonial 
structure, while the walls were more likely used for flood control than defense (Kenyon 
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and Holland 1981).  This provides evidence of an organized, hierarchical society capable 
of devoting time to public works instead of food production.  
The evolution of trade from early Natufian villages to the modern integrated 
economy was facilitated by the simultaneous evolution of institutions.  With the growth 
of population density and trade came the rise of the first city-states and early 
civilizations, eventually developing into economies capable of supporting massive works 
like the Hanging Gardens, extensive irrigation systems, the Pyramids, and countless 
religious edifices.   
As markets grew more complex and diverse, so too did institutions.  Early 
institutions all share one trait: they served the elite ruling class through resource 
appropriation.  Remarkable is that GDP per capita would, for thousands of years, 
remained at or near a subsistence level largely because extractive institutions remained 
the norm until political and social movements in Europe began to undermine the absolute 
authority of monarchal and dictatorial regimes.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL DRIFT 
Eventually a few states began to curtail the power of monarchical regimes.  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) found that small changes to existing governance 
structures can completely alter the economic and political landscape, for better or worse.  
One such ‘critical juncture’ was the signing of the Magna Carta in England 1215 CE.  
This was an eminently important moment when a monarch’s power was peacefully 
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curtailed.  Over the ensuing centuries, English parliament, nobility, and gentry slowly 
pried more and more power away from the monarchy.   
Another event that drastically altered the political and economic landscape during 
the late Middle Ages was the Black Death that swept Europe in the 14th century, wiping 
out a massive fraction of the population.  With half of the labor supply gone, demand for 
workers skyrocketed.  This economic imperative put much unanticipated power in the 
hands of a broader section of the population.  Political entities scrambled to enforce pre-
1347 C.E. labor policies that kept peasantry bound to the land.  The effects of such 
reactionary policies differed significantly between Eastern and Western Europe.  Eastern 
Europe was sufficiently decentralized that rulers were able to strengthen their control 
over the population, known as the Second Serfdom.   
In Western Europe it was different.  Workers were more urban and organized 
thanks to the more centralized political nature of Western states.  Amidst protestations 
and revolts they won concessions from rulers and found freedom from feudal ties.  The 
Black Death altered the economic landscape of Europe, providing the foundations for 
later political and economic reforms.  This critical juncture provided the economic shock 
necessary to shift the institutional trajectory of many economies. 
These changes led to the sort of institutions that provide incentives for growth.  
As the merchant class expanded, their power grew, as did their distrust of the crown.  
Political and economic concessions were won.  One example comes from 1588 CE, when 
Queen Elizabeth I requested additional tax revenue from Parliament (Parliament 
controlled taxes, a result of earlier concessions) to fund the effort against the Spanish 
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Armada.  In response they demanded further powers be devolved from the monarchy.  
Parliament won and funded the English Navy that subsequently served as a guard for the 
merchant fleet.  This happened at a time when other European powers monopolized 
overseas trade by channeling all merchant activity through their navies.  English 
institutions had begun a march toward inclusiveness.  Economic and political freedoms 
put more and more pressure on rulers to open markets further, thus moving institutions 
along the IPF toward the loss-minimizing equilibrium, as shown in Graph 7.  
Graph 7: Institutional drift in the IPF framework4 
 
                                                
4 Please note that losses from England’s institutions bundle in the 21st century are not necessarily accurately represented.  
The graph is merely intended to highlight how institutional drift decreases loss.  England’s drift toward inclusive institutions 
minimizes losses until the decrease in loss from decentralization roughly equaled the increase in loss from private expropriation.   
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The idea of institutional drift, that small changes and events leading different 
nations to form different institutions (Redmond 2005), is highlighted by the juxtaposition 
between England’s path from serfdom to freedom, and that of other European 
contemporaries.  England’s market openness led to one of the most significant events in 
human history: the Industrial Revolution.  People with talent were educated, incentivized, 
protected, and connected to diverse markets.  Innovation flourished.  As per capita GDP 
rose, so did the power of less noble citizens.  The more power divested away from the 
monarchy, the greater the economic options available to all citizens.  Created is a positive 
feedback loop where greater freedoms lead to demands for a more inclusive economy.  In 
some states this ‘virtuous circle’ perpetuated economic and political change.  Countries 
where this divestment of power doesn’t happen incur the opposite effect, where greater 
controls by central governments beget weaker individual rights.  In states with a very 
weak government, enforcing the rule of law becomes nearly impossible, creating a vast 
gap between ruling elites and the rest of the population.  
While the Industrial Revolution was sweeping the Western world, Eastern Europe 
was deeply resistant to change.  Sedentary laborers toiling quietly in small towns, 
villages, or on farms were of little threat to power.   Elites feared high concentrations of 
poor workers in cities, the result of labor demand in new factories.  Workers, if left 
unemployed by the creative destruction and labor churn that comes with economic 
growth, could become restless and violent.  Keeping workers in the countryside limited 
their interaction with new ideas.  Railways, too, were slow to wend their way across 
Eastern Europe, a result of the fear of a mobile population.  Eastern European states like 
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Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine still suffer from high levels of extraction.  Western Europe, 
however, grew relatively more productive as a result of economic openness.   
The legacy of those critical junctures is apparent today.  Variation in GDP per 
capita across economies today is vast.  The wealth gap between nations has grown 
rapidly in recent centuries.  The differences in income between states and regions in 
antiquity were tiny when compared to the drastic disparities of today.  This is known as 
the Great Divergence, as seen in Graph 1.  Output exploded and economies began to 
accumulate vast amounts of capital and wealth.  This had a profound effect on the 
average person.  They could plan for their futures, purchase healthcare, go to school, and 
procure goods otherwise available only to wealthy elites.  But in the centuries since other 
parts of the world have continued to languish in poverty.  Though Western powers were 
at the vanguard of an institutional shift toward inclusiveness, they did not always spread 
inclusivity to the native populations they encountered or the colonies they established.  
 
IV. NATURAL EXPERIMENTS AND CASE STUDIES 
To better understand how corruption and productivity interact, we first juxtapose 
inclusive and extractive institutions through available natural experiments and then 
further discuss how it is that some nations maintain inclusive institutions and why some 
seem to perpetuate corrupt ones. 
The roots of the modern wealth and productivity inequality between North and 
South America, for example, extend back to colonization (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2005).  As European powers began to accumulate more capital and wealth, they began to 
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exert control on overseas territories, usually in the hope of extracting wealth, as in South 
America.  Other regions, like North America5, became genetic offshoots.  The disparate 
experiences of the many European colonies are informed by how the New World was 
partitioned and exploited by colonial powers.   
In Central and South America, Europeans enslaved native populations, extracted 
vast amounts of wealth, and maintained order through political dominion. Where power 
is constrained to a small rich minority and political institutions are organized to prohibit 
any competition, lasting and effective change is difficult to come by.  With power 
transitions only between elites (or those that subsequently became elite), formed were 
institutions that concentrated all surplus resources in the hands of the wealthy.  The 
legacy endures.  Monopolies and extractive policies are still common in the region. 
Native economies that were most developed like those of the Andes region and 
Meso-America had extensive agricultural land capable of supporting their large urban 
centers.  Social hierarchy was well established and institutions already existed by the time 
contact was made.  Europeans were able to simply remove the native leaders thanks to 
their superior technology, diseases, and long history of warfare.  They usurped the 
extractive institutions already in place, as well as introducing their own, and pressed the 
population into slavery.  The legacy of expropriation continues today. 
With the work of subverting native populations in the more densely populated 
areas complete, the only regions left were those with low population density like the 
North American seaboard.  It was into these areas that large numbers of colonists settled, 
                                                
5 North America refers to the territory of modern Canada and the United States.  The Caribbean and Central America are considered 
part of South America in this paper, as they share similar colonial pasts. 
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often fleeing poverty or persecution.  They established more inclusive institutions in 
contrast to the monarchical systems they had fled.  The legacy of the different colonial 
governing strategies is apparent.  Regional economies that were relatively wealthy, as 
with the Aztecs and Incas, became impoverished while other regions populated by 
hunter-gatherers (as in most of North America) became much more wealthy.  Acemoglu 
et al. (2002) document how European colonial policies caused an “institutional reversal” 
in these regions. 
Where Central and South America were stripped of mineral wealth, North 
America had no gold and silver to expropriate.  Early settlers were unable to repeat the 
policies used in other parts of the New World, where colonial powers used the large 
native populations to strip the land of value.  Enslaving the local natives in North 
America was impractical, given their low population density.  Settlers found themselves 
unexpectedly working for a living.  Attempts by colonial authorities to extract wealth 
from colonists were mostly in vain as it was very easy to disappear into the vast frontier 
wilderness.  Eventually the companies and governments that sponsored settlement came 
to the conclusion that it would be more profitable to offer production incentives.  Since 
the colonists couldn’t be forced into servitude, authorities began to acquiesce to 
colonists’ demands for political rights.  Assemblies of landowners were created, giving 
political influence to a broader section of the early American colonist population.   
In some ways this mirrors the machinations of those early English nobles who 
wrested power away from the Monarchy.  In North America newfound work incentives 
were a productivity boon.  Patents were issued and enforced.  Anyone could own and 
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seek profit from an idea.  The incentivized population drove the economy forward.  The 
representative nature of the political systems that developed in continental North America 
functioned as a check on corruption.  Politicians who sought to consolidate power and 
enrich themselves unilaterally can be, and often were, voted out of office.  Their 
incentive is to maintain popular support so to stay in power.  The rule of law became 
supreme.  But if there is no mechanism to remove leaders from office, there is little 
consequence for rulers structuring institutions to support their own power and wealth. 
 A much more recent natural experiment that cleanly supports the institutions 
hypothesis is the Korean peninsula post 1953.  Since the end of the Korean War the 
North and South have taken divergent paths.  The totalitarian North saw a collapse in 
agriculture and regularly faces food crises and malnourishment.  There is little industry.  
Electricity is a luxury.  The government doesn’t acknowledge private property or enforce 
contracts.  There is no institutional evolution.  The government firmly controls the few 
markets that do exist.  In familiar terms, the political and economic institutions are 
completely controlled by a very small group of elites who extract every possible resource 
to enrich themselves and their supporters at the expense of the general population. 
 Just a few miles across the border, the South Korean economy flourishes.  In the 
years after the war the military elite dominated the political arena.  The economy, 
however, was not constrained and institutions were free to evolve.  Rule of law, private 
property, and a relative absence of monopoly encouraged innovation, investment, and 
trade.  There was a strong push to educate the populace, which provided a superior and 
more creative workforce.   
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 The Korean case study provides excellent insight into what encourages prosperity 
and what hinders it.  Inclusive institutions allow individuals to make the best use of their 
talent by choosing occupations where they can excel.  Strong public services, like an 
education and unbiased legal systems, level the playing field and empower would-be 
entrepreneurs, inventors, and academicians.  Conversely, extractive institutions funnel all 
surpluses away from the public and into the coffers of the ruling class.  There is no 
motivation for workers and entrepreneurs to produce, create, or learn if there are no 
rewards for doing so.  A strong central government, answerable to citizens, capable of 
providing a well-functioning system of public works, enforcing an unbiased legal system, 
and incentivizing innovation is key to a high standard of living. 
 Another experiment is that of Botswana and its impoverished African neighbors.  
The Sub-Saharan average per capita GDP is around $1,4006, while Botswana’s is almost 
$5,000 higher.  The regional average for control of corruption (on a scale of 0-100, where 
a score of 100 implies a complete lack of corruption7) is 45 with a standard deviation of 
11.  Botswana’s corruption controls score 73, more than two standard deviations higher 
than the regional average, putting it on par with Portugal, Spain, Estonia, and Taiwan.  
Zimbabwe, Botswana’s next-door neighbor with its infamous runaway inflation and 
ineffective government, has a GDP per capita of less than $500 and scores 30 out of 100 
for corruption control.  
 How do we account for this remarkable disparity?  In 1966 Botswana, with a 
population of 600,000, gained independence from Great Britain.  At the time there were 
                                                
6 All data in this section is for 2011, in 2005 USD, courtesy of the World Bank. 
7 Data is from the World Governance Index’s Control of Corruption index. 
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22 college graduates, 100 secondary school graduates, and 12 kilometers of paved road 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001) all in a nation with territory comparable to Texas.  The country is 
also landlocked, arid, and geographically isolated, which, according to the geography 
hypothesis, should be inimical to prosperity.  Botswana was a colonial backwater, but it 
did have rudimentary institutions based on the British common-law model.  When the 
Batswana peacefully gained their independence, they built upon these basic institutions, 
transforming them into a meritocracy.  That they eschewed extractive policies is likely a 
result of strong private property rights courtesy of the common law system, pre-colonial 
tribal affiliations that encouraged consensus rather than elite rule, and a diamond 
endowment that covers a portion of government revenue.  Rather than extracting wealth 
and enforcing monopolies, they invested aggressively in infrastructure, opened markets to 
foreign interests and prospectors, and subsidized industrial ventures.  In the ensuing 
years, Botswana has outpaced its continental counterparts in most measures of growth, as 
is certainly consistent with the idea of institutional drift. 
The final case study presented comes from Why Nations Fail (2012), which 
describes education in poor African countries to illustrate how the loss of economic 
incentives causes growth to stagnate.  Without any chance of making profit and 
improving one’s living conditions there is no incentive for parents to send their children 
to school.  This is especially true if the government doesn’t provide an education 
infrastructure.  The authors use the Congo region to showcase their thesis.  Soon after 
contact with European powers, Congolese rulers devised institutions that took extraction 
to an extreme: selling slaves on the international market.  This was so profitable that there 
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was no incentive to encourage any sort of political or economic reform.  There would be 
no benefit to them.  The country was kept very decentralized as a deterrent to organized 
opposition.  Aside from the slavery markets, little changed for the Congolese in the 
ensuing centuries.  The Congo region currently scores a 30 out of 100 in the control of 
corruption index. 
 
V. OTHER MODELS 
Let us now look at empirical evidence that corruption dampens output by limiting 
the usefulness of other inputs.  Hall and Jones (1999) examined the differences in 
productivity between nations and why some invest in more inputs than others.  They 
identify “social infrastructure” as motivating the differences in output per worker.  In 
their paper social infrastructure is defined as “the institutions and government policies 
that determine the economic environment within which individuals accumulate skills, and 
firms accumulate capital and produce output.”  This is the same underlying relationship 
studied in this paper.  Their definition firmly places social infrastructure as a determinant 
of the production function’s productivity multiplier, A, commensurate with corruption.  
The only difference is that they are studying corruption as it relates to output through its 
effect on inputs and productivity, as suggested by their infographic:  
Hall and Jones (1999): 
Institutions  !   (Inputs, Productivity)  !   Output per worker 
This paper, where italics are excluded from analysis: 
Institutions  !   Productivity  !   Inputs  !   Output per worker 
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The model presented in this paper seeks to specify only the institutions-
productivity relationship.  Hall’s dependent variable is output while mine is productivity.  
The basic difference is that Hall identifies corruption (social infrastructure) separately 
from productivity so to study its effects on output through its effects on productivity and 
inputs.  This is important as it means that their study still specifies the relationship 
between productivity and corruption, which informs the new model proposed in the next 
section.  The sample size for their analysis is 127 observations (countries) over one year, 
with a measure of corruption coming from a combination of two sources.  The new model 
proposed in this paper greatly expands the sample size to 1,691, covers 16 years, and uses 
measures of institutional inclusiveness compiled from at least four different sources for 
each year. 
 They encountered potential endogeneity when controlling for corruption.  High 
output might lead to corruption controls or low output might encourage extractive 
policies.  To remove any feedback, Hall instruments for corruption through trade and 
linguistic variables on the premise that the Western world first adopted inclusive 
institutions and subsequently spread them to colonies.  My approach will use very 
different instruments.  Their regression, however, provides some likely determinants that 
will be included in the new model, including a measure of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization as a reflection of national heterogeneity, distance from equator as a 
geographic indicator, and population as a “simple” way of scaling the economies. 
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 Lambsdorff (2003) performs a similar study: the effect of corruption as measured 
by the Corruption Perceptions Index, on productivity.  For a measure of productivity they 
use the ratio of GDP to capital stock.  The results are crossed checked with a number of 
alternative corruption variables, where the effect is robust.  The paper also notes that 
there is a tradeoff between government power and disorder, where extremes discourage 
productivity.  He finds that a decrease in corruption by one unit on a scale of 10 increases 
productivity by 2%. 
 
VI. NEW MODEL 
 We already have a measure of productivity, as calculated from a basic production 
function.  A corruption variable, however, cannot be so neatly calculated.  Since 
observable data for corruption is so characteristically rare, it is difficult to accurately 
account for corruption’s economic effects.  Since we are looking only for a general, 
aggregate connection between corruption and productivity, we can use several corruption 
indexes as data substitutes.  Compiled from both hard data and expert surveys, these 
indexes provide insight into the perceived level of corruption in an economy.  That they 
are not strictly based on hard data is not an obstacle.  First, we have a large observation 
size that should mitigate irregularities in the data.  Second, perception or expectation of 
corruption informs the decisions of economically active people.  Firms are less likely to 
invest in a country where corruption is perceived to be high (Wei 2000, Jensen 2003, 
2008).  Perceptions matter in determining the risks of investing.  Third, included are four 
different indexes to crosscheck the regression results. 
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The first index, control of corruption, is published as part of the World 
Governance Index8.  The WGI is an aggregate measure of governance taken from 
existing data sources and surveys.  According to the creators, Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2010), the index reflects “the views on governance of survey respondents and 
public, private, and NGO sector experts worldwide.”  The control of corruption index 
captures the “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state 
by elites and private interests.”  The data comes from 31 different sources.  An alternative 
index is the Corruption Perception Index9, published by Transparency International.  
 As noted earlier, the relationship between corruption controls and productivity 
might be endogenous: it is possible that productivity levels have an effect on institutional 
quality.  Productivity increases and the resulting surge of wealth may encourage a move 
toward the more inclusive, loss-minimizing equilibrium.  Additionally, poor nations may 
not have the necessary resources to build effective institutions (Hall and Jones 1999).  
We will account for the potential feedback by instrumenting for corruption in the 
regression.  A measure of press freedom will be used, as it has been shown to be a 
powerful control on corruption by Brunetti and Weder (2003):  
“An independent press is probably one of the most effective institutions to 
uncover trespassing by government officials. The reason is that any independent 
journalist has a strong incentive to investigate and uncover stories on wrongdoing. 
                                                
8 From the World Bank: “Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This 
includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them.” 
9 From Transparency International: “The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their 
public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index – a combination of polls – drawing on corruption-related data collected by a 
variety of reputable institutions. The CPI reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working 
in the countries and territories evaluated.” 
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Countries with a free press should, therefore, ceteris paribus, have less corruption 
than countries where the press is controlled and censored.”   
 
For the press instrument, two different indexes will be used to corroborate the results.  
The first is compiled by Reports Without Borders, the second by Freedom House.  As the 
press freedom instruments are surveys and not hard data, also included will be a measure 
of luxury resource endowments.  Luxury resources are unlikely to have much of an effect 
on productivity.  They are not used as production inputs.  Any expropriation that occurs 
in these mining industries will not affect productivity, except through the predicted 
welfare loss.  Thus, rent-seeking in mining industries like gold and diamonds is not 
expected to affect productivity, except through corruption.  Luxury resources will also be 
effective instruments for corruption. 
 To parse out the effect of corruption controls on productivity we need to identify 
the other determinants of productivity.  First we control for macro shocks by adding 
dummy variables for each year of data.  We also control for the scale of the economy by 
including a population variable.  Many studies have specified the natural resource 
relationship with productivity (Jorgenson 1984, 1984) and corruption (Leite and 
Weidmann 1999).  As such we need to include appropriate variables to account for any 
effect.  Since there is a notable difference between energy resources and luxury 
resources, we can separately explore resources’ effect on corruption and productivity.  
Ayres et al. (2013) and Murillo-Zamorano (2005) documents the positive relationship 
between energy and economic and productivity growth, respectively.  We specify an 
energy variable that controls for production of all energy, including oil, coal, natural gas, 
and alternative sources.   
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In Section III, we noted that secure property rights incentivized English inventors 
and entrepreneurs.  Early advancements in industrial machinery, especially textiles, 
created demand for factory labor in cities.  New markets grew to support the burgeoning 
populations.  The growing population densities increased the frequency of money 
exchange, the dissemination of ideas and technologies, and the concentration of human 
capital (Rauch 1993).  Most economic activity happens in cities (about 90% in the US), 
and there is a strong relationship between productivity and city size (Abel et al. 2011, 
Ciccone and Hall 1996).  The new model captures this effect through a measure of the 
proportion of the population living in urban environments.  We can expect nations with 
low levels of urban population to be less productive than more urban economies. 
Given the large body of literature documenting the geographic hypothesis, and 
that geography was a likely determinant of early human development, we include 
variables that control for average temperature, precipitation, and a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not a country has a coast.  Additionally, regional dummies are 
included to control for regional culture, weather patterns, economic shocks, stability, 
shared history, and internal trade patterns. 
 Another necessary specification is the level of technology available to firms and 
consumers.  The proportion of the population with a phone line (landline or cellular) is a 
good indicator.  Phones require infrastructure, be it cell towers or hard lines.  
Infrastructure needs to be secured, so we can expect few lines in disordered states.  
Should the ruling regime instead have authoritarian tendencies, monopolies can be 
enforced in the telecom industry, causing prices to rise, and thus limiting access.   
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Additionally, phones are the oldest widely adopted long-distance communications 
technology.  Invented in 1876, phones have had a long time to be put into use.  Any 
population able to acquire phones does.  Since technology tends to flow downhill 
between countries and, for the most part, ignore national boundaries, the only 
impediment to adoption is the institutional framework that either makes infrastructure 
investment too risky or telephone access too expensive.  While autocrats can outlaw 
technologies, they also have corrupt tendencies, so the effect is still the same.  In 
advanced economies telephones are ubiquitous and inextricably linked to many aspects of 
life: talking to clients, friends, family, and emergency services. 
Cell phones are a newer technology, being adopted over the course of the sample, 
1996-2011 (Graph 8 and 9).  There are six times as many subscriptions in the United 
States in the last year of the sample, 2011, as there were in the first year, 1996.  
Controlling separately for cell phones captures how readily a new technology is adopted 
into an economy where as fixed lines are more a measure of technology level. 
Graph 8: Fixed lines and tfp Graph 9: Cell subscriptions and tfp 
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Graph 8 shows a strong positive correlation with comparatively little dispersion.  
Cell adoption happened very quickly in highly productive nations.  Fixed lines have had 
more than a 130 years to find their way into homes and offices.  That they haven’t been 
widely adopted in all nations strongly suggests that, as technology itself is spreads easily, 
other factors must be discouraging investment in the requisite infrastructure.  Cell phones 
are quickly adopted in the same productive nations that had already made extensive use 
of communication networks.  
 
VII. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The primary regression will use the control of corruption (ctrlcorr) variable from 
the World Governance Index and the freedom of the press (fppress), as published by 
Freedom House, as the instrumental variable.  Both variables will be crosschecked with 
Transparency International’s corruption perception’s index (cpi) and Reporters Without 
Borders’ press freedom index (rsfpress).  They are not combined, as some of their 
components overlap, potentially giving undue weight to some sources.  The first 
regression, and the one referenced throughout this paper, uses the control of corruption 
and freedom of the press as they give the largest sample size, 1,691, across the most 
years, 1996-2011.  Chart 1 gives the results of this primary regression.  Year and regional 
dummies are included, though not reported in the chart.  The full regression results can be 
found under Regression I in the Appendix. 
 In the first iteration, where the control of corruption is the sole independent 
variable (still instrumented), we see that a unit increase in the control of corruption (on a 
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scale of 100, where 100 is an economy with no corruption) increases expected total factor 
productivity by 4.43%.  The second iteration includes year and region dummies.  The 
additional variables decrease the control of corruption effect to 3.64%.  The third 
regression adds the three geography variables, but no explanatory power is removed from 
corruption.  Technology variables are added in the fourth, where they capture a healthy 
portion of the variation in productivity and lower the corruption control effect to 1.33%.  
The 5th iteration gives the final effect of corruption control.  A country that 
increases its perceived control of corruption enough to move up by one, on a scale of 100, 
also increases aggregate productivity in the economy by 1.96%, all other factors constant.  
This represents the lower bound of the effect.  The other limit comes from Regression II, 
using the press freedom index to instrument for control of corruption, where the effect is 
a 2.61% increase in productivity.  This is remarkably higher than was found by 
Lambsdorff (2003), where a unit increase in the control of corruption, on the same scale 
of 100, increased productivity by .2%.  Where the models differ is in the way 
productivity is measured.  Whereas this paper uses total factor productivity as the 
dependent, Lambsdorff uses the ratio of GDP to capital as the measure of productivity.  
The sample size in Lamsdorff’s regressions is also less than 100. 
In the 5th iteration all geographic variables are significant once corruption, 
technology, energy, population, and urbanization have been controlled.  This suggests 
that geographic variables are still strong determinants of productivity, all else constant.  
Nations with access to coastal waters are expected to be 9.54% more productive than 
landlocked countries.  An additional centimeter of annual rainfall is expected to increase 
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Chart 1: Regression results 
   
log(tfp) Variable
α=0.35 1st ♮2nd 3rd 4th 5th α=0.3 name
0.0443 0.036 0.0364 0.0133 0.0196 0.0208
(0.001) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022)
0.0115 0.0115 0.0136 0.0143
(0.0024) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.0059 **0.0033 0.0082 0.0071
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.002) (0.002)
0.2657 0.1811 0.0954 0.1005
(0.0299) (0.0264) (0.0289) (0.0297)
0.0162 0.015 0.0151
(0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0017)
0.0063 0.0047 0.005
(0.0005) (0.005) (0.0005)
0.0944 0.0983
(0.0057) (0.0059)
-0.1095 -0.1156
(0.0094) (0.0096)
0.0045 0.0054
(0.0007) (0.0007)
***-.0009 **-.0011
(0.0006) (0.0006)
***.0007 ***.0009
(0.0007) (0.0007)
2.1639 2.8258 2.4294 2.7114 3.6096 3.3909
(0.0569) (0.1199) (0.1258) (0.1245) (0.1931) (0.1982)
observations 2031 2031 2025 2012 1691 1691
R-squared 0.6235 0.7541 0.773 0.8281 0.8661 0.8726
* insignificant at the 1% level ** insignificant at the 5% level *** insignificant at the 10% level
♮ adds year and region dummies
linguistic diversity
ethnic diversity
constant
control of corruption
mean temperature
precipitation
coastal border
telephone landlines
cell subscriptions
lfrac
efrac
_cons
ctrlcorr
tmean
precip
coast
phone
cell
Iterations
2SLS regressions, where freedom of the press (fppress) instruments control of corruption
lnenergy
lnpop
urban
log(energy)
log(population)
urbanization
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tfp by .82%.  Where mean temperature increases by one degree Celsius, productivity also 
increases by 1.36%.  Warmer and wetter climates tend to be more productive once the 
other variables have been controlled.  While disease burdens and other problems 
suggested to plague tropical areas may have some negative effect on productivity, the 
effects are not strong enough to upset a biological imperative.  Life seems to flourish 
where the water is plentiful and the weather is warm.  Cross-checking these variables 
with the other measures of corruption control and press freedom, coastal access is 
insignificant at the 5% level in Regression III, precipitation is insignificant at the 1% 
level in Regression IV.  Temperature is significant across all regressions. 
The technology variables are both significant and positive.  There is a potential 
endogeneity issue where high productivity levels might encourage the adoption of new 
technologies.  But if technology is synonymous with tools, then any decrease in the 
number or quality of tools available would cause productivity would plummet.  A ready 
example is that of the transition to sedentary life in early prehistory.  It wasn’t until 
human populations settled that they were able to accumulate the tools that allowed, for 
example, more efficient harvesting, cooking, and transporting.  The archeological 
evidence documents all of these innovations: the development of the sickle, the transition 
from cooking stones to clay pots, and the construction of baskets to transport goods.   
Technology drives productivity.  Institutions influence how readily new 
technologies are adopted.  It is important to note that cell and phone are proxy variables 
for different aspects of technology.  Cell phones are included as a proxy for how quickly 
a highly useful technology can be adopted.  Hard line phones are a proxy for the overall 
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technology level achievable by a country.  These variables are significant in all 
regressions examined in this paper. 
Energy production, as expected, has a positive relationship with productivity: a 
1% increase in energy production increases productivity by .094%.  Conversely, larger 
populations have a negative relationship with productivity, where a percentage increase 
leads to a .11% decrease in tfp.  This finding reflects that of Pritchett (1996), who 
identifies a weak negative correlation between tfp and population growth.  The slightly 
negative relationship can be observed even before controlling for the other variables, as 
below in Graph 10.  The relationship suggests decreasing returns to productivity as 
economies grow in scale. 
Graph 10: Population and tfp 
 
The level of urbanization is a significant and positive determinant of productivity, 
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productivity by .45%.   Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, however, are not 
significant determinants of productivity in any of the regressions.  Hall and Jones (1999) 
included a similar variable, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, as a determinant of output.  
Thought they find it does have an effect on output, any affect it has on tfp is captured by 
the other variables in the model. 
An alternative calculation of productivity is used as the response in the last 
column.  Changing the exponent on the capital share of production from .35 to .3 (and 
thus labor share from .65 to .7) has minimal effect on the outcomes.  The regression is 
also run with per capita measures of tfp and energy, as in Regression VI, but no 
significant differences are found. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper affirms that aggregate productivity is strongly affected by the 
perceived level of corruption.  The model presented here has isolated a direct and 
significant relationship between the control of corruption and aggregate productivity.  
Any national economy willing to tackle corruption can expect productivity to rise rapidly, 
between 2% and 2.6% for every ‘unit’ increase in the control of corruption, all other 
variables constant.  
There is an important difference in how corruption manifests.  Centralized, top-
down patterns of extraction still experience some growth.  Successful civilizations 
throughout history have operated under such extractive institutions.  Corruption is 
coordinated by the central authorities, who set extraction to levels that maximize their 
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wealth.  Growth can still happen under extractive regimes.  In a country without a strong 
government able to control its agents, however, lawlessness and disorder abound.   
Disordered states require stronger central governments to root out corruption, and 
can improve their productivity either weakly through a shift toward a dictatorial regime 
or strongly through the adoption of more powerful and inclusive institutions.  For the 
economies constrained by top-down corruption, productivity can only increase with drift 
away from monarchical and autocratic governance.  This is highlighted by the significant 
events like the signing of the Magna Carta, the French Revolution, and the end of 
Apartheid.  These events all devolved power away from systems that worked against the 
best interests of the majority of the population.  
The productivity boost from healthy, inclusive institutions provides additional 
flexibility in how an economy chooses its inputs, as there is an increase in overall 
economic potential.  An example of this flexibility can be seen in how a country deals 
with negative public externalities like the pollution from energy use and population 
growth.  A country that is more efficient (or more productive with current inputs) has 
more flexibility in dealing with pollution pressure.  Though controlling pollution is, of 
course, a matter of public will and preference (at least in a full democracy), belief that the 
economy will grow as a result of increased productivity alters the tradeoff between 
growth and pollution.  Is sacrificing a bit of this newfound economic potential worth the 
future rewards of staving off pollution?  Such a decision is most equitably made in a 
democracy, where decisions about overall welfare aren’t subject to an autocrat’s whim. 
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There are other benefits to good institutions.  The increase in productivity can 
counteract other inherent disadvantages like geographic variables.  This is clearly 
exemplified in the Botswana case study, where a geographically disadvantaged but 
institutionally strong economy has grown far faster than its neighbors.   
While the conclusion of this paper is simple enough—increase productivity by 
controlling corruption—in practice there are many obstacles to practical implementation.  
The problem is that good economic policies are often bad politics.  An authoritarian ruler 
requires a base of support to maintain power.  The easiest way to maintaining power is to 
offer monopolies, kickbacks, or other considerations to allies that ultimately undermine 
the economic potential on the nation.  There is a strong incentive for corrupt officials and 
rulers to maintain that corruption.  Though the effects of damaging for the economy as a 
whole, bureaucrats and the ruling classes have more power and higher income than they 
would in an inclusive economy.  If, however, the rulers and public officials are held 
accountable and incentivized to not take bribes, social loss is minimized.  A highly 
effective way of rooting out corruption is an unrestricted press, who are strongly 
incentivized to uncover corrupt practices.   
This paper concludes that economies willing to control corruption are much more 
productive than economies constrained by the high levels of corruption associated with 
the exclusive institutions of both highly centralized and decentralized states.  Institutional 
change comes in three forms.  First, for states that are able to implement effective 
corruption controls there is a feedback effect that seems to encourage movement toward a 
loss-minimizing equilibrium.  Secondly, rulers that eschew good economics for good 
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politics drive institutions away from the inclusive equilibrium.  Finally, states that fall 
into disorder, as is currently the case in Somalia, Libya, and Syria, can expect lower 
levels of productivity than either of the other equilibriums.  In short, economies that are 
willing to install even moderate corruption controls are expected to be significantly more 
productive.  
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IX. APPENDIX 
 
Variable Explanations: 
 
Total factor productivity (lntfp): Logarithmic transformation of the productivity 
multiplier from a production function where α = .35, constructed from other production 
function variables.  Measures of output and labor come from the World Bank.  Measures 
of capital stock and human capital come from Penn World Tables.  
 
Alternative measure of total factor productivity (lntfpalt): Logarithmic transformation 
of the productivity multiplier from a production function where α = .30, constructed from 
other production function variables.  Measures of output and labor come from the World 
Bank.  Measures of capital stock and human capital come from Penn World Tables. 
 
Control of corruption (ctrlcorr): From the World Governance Index, a measure of how 
well a country controls corruption.  Data in each year is combined from a number of 
different surveys and studies. 
 
Corruption Perception Index (cpi): From Transparency International, a measure of how 
corrupt a nation is perceived to be.  Data in each year is combined from a number of 
different surveys and studies. 
 
Freedom of the Press (fppress): From Freedom House, an index compiled from surveys 
by more than 60 analysts that describes the level of press freedom in a country. 
 
Freedom Press Index (rsfpress): From Reports Without Borders, an index compiled 
from questionnaires given to journalists and NGO that describes the level of press 
freedom in a country. 
 
Mean Temperature (tmean): From the World Bank, the average annual temperature in 
degrees Celsius for a country. 
 
Precipitation (precip): From the World Bank, the annual rainfall in centimeters  
 
Coast (coast): A dummy variable indicating whether a country has a coastal border. 
 
Telephone Landlines (phone): From the World Bank, fixed telephone lines per hundred 
people, where a fixed line connects the user to a switchboard network. 
 
Cellular Subscriptions (cell): From the World Bank, subscriptions per hundred people 
to public mobile telephone networks as accessed from cellular technology. 
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Energy production (lnenergy): From the International Energy Agency, energy and 
electricity produced from petroleum, natural gas, coal, lignite, combustible renewals, 
waste- converted into oil equivalents.  
 
Population (lnpop): From the World Bank, log transformation for national populations. 
 
Urbanization (urban): From the World Bank, proportion of national population living in 
urban environments calculated from World Bank population estimates and urban ratios 
from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects. 
 
Linguistic Fractionalization (lfrac): From Alesina et al. (2003), the probability that two 
randomly selected persons will not be from the same linguistic group. 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization (efrac): From Alesina et al. (2003), the probability that two 
randomly selected persons will not be from the same ethnic group. 
 
Regional Dummies: Dummy variables indicating whether a country is part of the 
Western world (west, the excluded control variable), Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(eeca), Asia (asia), Middle East and North Africa (mena), Sub-Saharan Africa (ssa), or 
Central and South America and the Caribbean (csac). 
 
Chart 2: Variable summary 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
tfp 1691 187.9323 169.7379 7.6337 877.982
lntfp 1691 4.7951 0.9924 2.0326 6.7776
tfpalt 1691 169.1556 159.3975 6.2744 841.8193
lntfpalt 1691 4.6464 1.0443 1.8365 6.7356
ctrlcorr 1691 58.4994 19.6559 18 100
cpi 1338 46.9133 23.611 4 100
fppress 1691 56.8351 23.176 0.1 95
rsfpress 1027 75.5076 22.8986 -36.6 110
tmean 1691 16.4763 8.6962 -5.4 27.9
precip 1691 10.5459 7.2444 0.51 29.26
phone 1691 23.615 20.1361 0.0061 74.7625
cell 1691 49.9861 45.1561 0 215.5038
lnenergy 1691 9.4306 2.3547 -0.5997 14.7044
lnpop 1691 16.3745 1.6109 12.5022 21.019
urban 1691 61.9298 21.5483 9.8642 100
lfrac 1691 36.4956 28.0293 0.21 89.83
efrac 1691 41.1954 25.0175 0.2 87.47
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Chart 3: Correlation matrix 
     Variables
tfp
tfpalt
ctrlcorr
cpi
fppress
rsfpress
diam
ond
gold
tm
ean
precip
phone
cell
energy
pop
urban
lfrac
tfp
1
tfpalt
0.9994
1
ctrlcorr
0.8329
0.8347
1
cpi
0.8351
0.837
0.9816
1
fppress
0.6045
0.6015
0.7494
0.7084
1
rsfpress
0.4567
0.4548
0.5583
0.5259
0.8076
1
diam
ond
-0.0796
-0.078
-0.0746
-0.0517
-0.1282
-0.0301
1
gold
-0.0118
-0.0115
0.0429
0.0534
0.0237
0.0409
0.3483
1
tm
ean
-0.3957
-0.3987
-0.4494
-0.46
-0.4378
-0.3481
-0.0961
0.0707
1
precip
-0.1173
-0.1213
-0.0826
-0.0866
-0.0082
-0.0038
-0.088
-0.0661
0.4138
1
phone
0.7911
0.792
0.8143
0.8095
0.6545
0.4603
-0.0163
0.0129
-0.5968
-0.1133
1
cell
0.5135
0.5191
0.5114
0.5178
0.3777
0.2224
-0.0422
-0.0218
-0.3245
-0.0599
0.5482
1
energy
0.0425
0.0456
0.0046
0.0207
-0.1229
-0.2724
0.2434
0.0613
-0.2136
-0.1283
0.1324
-0.0051
1
pop
-0.1355
-0.1335
-0.1176
-0.1071
-0.1317
-0.3068
0.0045
-0.001
-0.0149
-0.0028
-0.0669
-0.1573
0.6713
1
urban
0.6017
0.606
0.6207
0.6238
0.3793
0.2741
0.0134
0.0537
-0.2995
-0.109
0.6076
0.5153
0.0744
-0.1763
1
lfrac
-0.3349
-0.3323
-0.3376
-0.3224
-0.2738
-0.1548
0.0965
0.0353
0.3029
-0.019
-0.459
-0.3379
-0.0818
0.0407
-0.4115
1
efrac
-0.3922
-0.3938
-0.4577
-0.4552
-0.373
-0.1983
0.0019
-0.0077
0.4101
0.0689
-0.5484
-0.3806
-0.0646
-0.0626
-0.3125
0.7207
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Chart 4: Countries in sample 
 
The 108 economies used in Regression I, by region. 
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Regression I 
First Stage 
 
A two-stage least squares regression, with the World Governance Index’s control of 
corruption variable (ctrlcorr) and the Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press (fppress) as 
the instrument. 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     41.49687   3.432169    12.09   0.000     34.76503    48.22872
      lngold    -.1821853   .0523052    -3.48   0.001    -.2847765   -.0795941
   lndiamond     .2479455   .0492414     5.04   0.000     .1513635    .3445275
     fppress     .3067728   .0161763    18.96   0.000     .2750446     .338501
              
       2011     -6.764964   1.581344    -4.28   0.000    -9.866608   -3.663321
       2010     -6.519798   1.531085    -4.26   0.000    -9.522863   -3.516733
       2009     -6.293341   1.479864    -4.25   0.000    -9.195941   -3.390741
       2008     -5.580282    1.43129    -3.90   0.000     -8.38761   -2.772954
       2007     -5.256962   1.372963    -3.83   0.000    -7.949887   -2.564038
       2006     -5.043238   1.315106    -3.83   0.000    -7.622683   -2.463793
       2005     -4.848387   1.262851    -3.84   0.000     -7.32534   -2.371435
       2004     -3.976292   1.227856    -3.24   0.001    -6.384605   -1.567978
       2003     -3.070542   1.207047    -2.54   0.011     -5.43804   -.7030443
       2002     -3.239593   1.193804    -2.71   0.007    -5.581117   -.8980696
       2001     -3.211582    1.18192    -2.72   0.007    -5.529796   -.8933687
       2000      -2.36897   1.170082    -2.02   0.043    -4.663965    -.073975
       1999     -1.248123   1.166598    -1.07   0.285    -3.536284    1.040038
       1998     -.5307221   1.162352    -0.46   0.648    -2.810556    1.749111
       1997     -.2696248   1.163965    -0.23   0.817    -2.552621    2.013372
        year  
              
         ssa     7.361554   1.188712     6.19   0.000     5.030017     9.69309
        mena     10.70632   1.227848     8.72   0.000     8.298022    13.11462
        eeca    -5.105467   1.236508    -4.13   0.000     -7.53075   -2.680183
        csac     -.121174   1.065347    -0.11   0.909    -2.210743    1.968395
        asia     7.303675   .9963307     7.33   0.000     5.349475    9.257875
       efrac    -.0526751   .0150537    -3.50   0.000    -.0822013   -.0231489
       lfrac     .0406084   .0138578     2.93   0.003     .0134277     .067789
       urban     .1096815   .0152906     7.17   0.000     .0796906    .1396723
       lnpop    -1.343867   .2113022    -6.36   0.000    -1.758315   -.9294198
    lnenergy     .2972991   .1341697     2.22   0.027     .0341391     .560459
        cell      .051966   .0105283     4.94   0.000     .0313159    .0726161
       phone     .5031079   .0236314    21.29   0.000     .4567575    .5494584
       coast    -.5147894   .6693546    -0.77   0.442    -1.827659    .7980805
      precip     .1457077   .0460581     3.16   0.002     .0553695    .2360458
       tmean    -.1293056   .0453632    -2.85   0.004    -.2182808   -.0403305
                                                                              
    ctrlcorr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     8.3901
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.8178
                                                  R-squared       =     0.8214
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000
                                                  F(  33,   1657) =     230.86
                                                  Number of obs   =       1691
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Regression I 
Second Stage 
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     3.609641   .1931256    18.69   0.000     3.231121     3.98816
              
       2011     -.5049438   .0707971    -7.13   0.000    -.6437035    -.366184
       2010      -.489353   .0685375    -7.14   0.000     -.623684   -.3550219
       2009     -.4773705   .0662408    -7.21   0.000       -.6072   -.3475409
       2008     -.4084815   .0637066    -6.41   0.000    -.5333441    -.283619
       2007     -.3547301   .0610149    -5.81   0.000    -.4743172    -.235143
       2006     -.3082083    .058417    -5.28   0.000    -.4227035    -.193713
       2005     -.2520123   .0560004    -4.50   0.000    -.3617711   -.1422534
       2004     -.2204959   .0541172    -4.07   0.000    -.3265636   -.1144282
       2003     -.2017424   .0528319    -3.82   0.000    -.3052909   -.0981938
       2002     -.1695333    .052324    -3.24   0.001    -.2720865   -.0669802
       2001     -.1508126   .0516905    -2.92   0.004    -.2521242    -.049501
       2000     -.1167798   .0509927    -2.29   0.022    -.2167237   -.0168359
       1999     -.0902313   .0506084    -1.78   0.075     -.189422    .0089594
       1998     -.0522296   .0503264    -1.04   0.299    -.1508676    .0464084
       1997     -.0229611   .0503677    -0.46   0.648    -.1216801    .0757578
        year  
              
         ssa    -.1105426    .050748    -2.18   0.029     -.210007   -.0110783
        mena     .4163284   .0478052     8.71   0.000     .3226319     .510025
        eeca    -.6461308   .0573543   -11.27   0.000    -.7585431   -.5337184
        csac     -.043934   .0460783    -0.95   0.340    -.1342459    .0463778
        asia     -.367182    .042947    -8.55   0.000    -.4513566   -.2830074
       efrac     .0007223   .0006699     1.08   0.281    -.0005907    .0020353
       lfrac    -.0008552   .0006147    -1.39   0.164    -.0020601    .0003496
       urban     .0044942   .0007025     6.40   0.000     .0031172    .0058711
       lnpop     -.109515    .009395   -11.66   0.000     -.127929   -.0911011
    lnenergy     .0944116   .0057066    16.54   0.000     .0832268    .1055964
        cell     .0047144    .000472     9.99   0.000     .0037893    .0056395
       phone     .0149557   .0016909     8.84   0.000     .0116415    .0182698
       coast     .0954132   .0289396     3.30   0.001     .0386927    .1521337
      precip     .0081592   .0019722     4.14   0.000     .0042937    .0120246
       tmean      .013647    .001993     6.85   0.000     .0097408    .0175531
    ctrlcorr     .0196031   .0021738     9.02   0.000     .0153425    .0238637
                                                                              
       lntfp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .36305
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8661
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000
                                                       Wald chi2(31) =10926.37
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =    1691
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Regression I-A 
First Stage 
 
A two-stage least squares regression, with the World Governance Index’s control of 
corruption variable (ctrlcorr) and the Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press (fppress) as 
the instrument, where insignificant fractionalization measures are excluded. 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     39.63647   3.344721    11.85   0.000     33.07624    46.19669
      lngold    -.1896668   .0514198    -3.69   0.000      -.29052   -.0888137
   lndiamond     .2568348   .0488479     5.26   0.000     .1610261    .3526435
     fppress     .3116604    .015988    19.49   0.000      .280302    .3430189
              
       2011     -6.979854   1.553318    -4.49   0.000    -10.02648   -3.933226
       2010     -6.719314   1.504398    -4.47   0.000    -9.669993   -3.768636
       2009     -6.469272   1.454417    -4.45   0.000    -9.321918   -3.616626
       2008     -5.707884   1.406943    -4.06   0.000    -8.467417   -2.948351
       2007     -5.381341   1.349995    -3.99   0.000    -8.029177   -2.733505
       2006     -5.104253   1.292901    -3.95   0.000    -7.640107     -2.5684
       2005     -4.938742   1.242017    -3.98   0.000    -7.374794    -2.50269
       2004     -4.103713    1.20844    -3.40   0.001    -6.473908   -1.733518
       2003     -3.184572   1.188346    -2.68   0.007    -5.515355   -.8537895
       2002     -3.417735   1.175837    -2.91   0.004    -5.723984   -1.111485
       2001     -3.376351   1.164577    -2.90   0.004    -5.660515   -1.092188
       2000     -2.482303   1.153479    -2.15   0.032      -4.7447   -.2199065
       1999     -1.371921   1.150382    -1.19   0.233    -3.628243    .8844014
       1998     -.6324707   1.146407    -0.55   0.581    -2.880996    1.616055
       1997     -.3159031   1.148021    -0.28   0.783    -2.567595    1.935788
        year  
              
         ssa     7.122071   1.119053     6.36   0.000     4.927197    9.316945
        mena      10.2772    1.20102     8.56   0.000     7.921554    12.63284
        eeca     -5.15121   1.210204    -4.26   0.000    -7.524865   -2.777554
        csac    -1.326583   .9997348    -1.33   0.185     -3.28743    .6342648
        asia     7.698915    .984402     7.82   0.000      5.76814    9.629689
       urban     .1073184   .0149837     7.16   0.000     .0779299     .136707
       lnpop    -1.211339   .2062358    -5.87   0.000    -1.615843   -.8068345
    lnenergy     .2185311   .1301376     1.68   0.093    -.0367167    .4737788
        cell     .0537466   .0103197     5.21   0.000     .0335059    .0739873
       phone     .5076366   .0233451    21.74   0.000     .4618482     .553425
       coast    -.7393816   .6623108    -1.12   0.264    -2.038417    .5596535
      precip     .1250969   .0454462     2.75   0.006     .0359602    .2142336
       tmean    -.1186302   .0444769    -2.67   0.008    -.2058658   -.0313946
                                                                              
    ctrlcorr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     8.3546
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.8182
                                                  R-squared       =     0.8215
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000
                                                  F(  31,   1691) =     251.06
                                                  Number of obs   =       1723
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Regression I-A 
Second Stage 
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     3.684499   .1903666    19.35   0.000     3.311388    4.057611
              
       2011     -.5311851   .0718832    -7.39   0.000    -.6720735   -.3902967
       2010     -.5128507   .0696055    -7.37   0.000    -.6492749   -.3764265
       2009     -.4998703   .0672734    -7.43   0.000    -.6317238   -.3680168
       2008     -.4311946   .0646788    -6.67   0.000    -.5579627   -.3044265
       2007     -.3761033   .0619586    -6.07   0.000      -.49754   -.2546666
       2006      -.327201   .0592749    -5.52   0.000    -.4433776   -.2110244
       2005     -.2681592   .0568562    -4.72   0.000    -.3795952   -.1567231
       2004     -.2313593   .0549853    -4.21   0.000    -.3391285   -.1235901
       2003     -.2103287   .0536764    -3.92   0.000    -.3155325   -.1051248
       2002     -.1742929   .0532006    -3.28   0.001    -.2785641   -.0700218
       2001     -.1547851   .0525616    -2.94   0.003    -.2578039   -.0517663
       2000     -.1201364   .0518612    -2.32   0.021    -.2217826   -.0184903
       1999     -.0910897   .0514827    -1.77   0.077    -.1919939    .0098144
       1998     -.0515135    .051199    -1.01   0.314    -.1518618    .0488347
       1997     -.0226512   .0512345    -0.44   0.658     -.123069    .0777666
        year  
              
         ssa    -.1353835   .0494055    -2.74   0.006    -.2322165   -.0385505
        mena     .4503752   .0476883     9.44   0.000     .3569079    .5438426
        eeca    -.6421904   .0580413   -11.06   0.000    -.7559493   -.5284316
        csac     .0222611   .0446475     0.50   0.618    -.0652464    .1097687
        asia    -.3802135   .0440329    -8.63   0.000    -.4665164   -.2939106
       urban      .003752   .0007039     5.33   0.000     .0023725    .0051315
       lnpop    -.1130261   .0093333   -12.11   0.000     -.131319   -.0947332
    lnenergy     .0941652   .0056989    16.52   0.000     .0829956    .1053347
        cell     .0048445    .000479    10.11   0.000     .0039057    .0057832
       phone     .0146962    .001717     8.56   0.000     .0113309    .0180616
       coast     .1141472   .0295639     3.86   0.000      .056203    .1720914
      precip     .0079289   .0020028     3.96   0.000     .0040035    .0118544
       tmean     .0138319   .0020084     6.89   0.000     .0098954    .0177684
    ctrlcorr     .0200316   .0021758     9.21   0.000      .015767    .0242961
                                                                              
       lntfp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .37282
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8569
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000
                                                       Wald chi2(29) =10324.80
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =    1723
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Regression II 
First Stage 
 
A two-stage least squares regression, using the World Governance Index’s control of 
corruption variable (ctrlcorr) and the Freedom Press Index published by Reporters 
Without Borders (rsfpress) as the instrument. 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     42.96004   5.117286     8.40   0.000     32.91821    53.00188
      lngold    -.2773598    .066078    -4.20   0.000     -.407027   -.1476926
   lndiamond     .1831368   .0654285     2.80   0.005     .0547441    .3115296
    rsfpress     .1809921   .0187179     9.67   0.000     .1442611     .217723
              
       2011             0  (omitted)
       2010     -1.317704   1.221154    -1.08   0.281     -3.71402    1.078611
       2009     -1.527149   1.242413    -1.23   0.219    -3.965181    .9108839
       2008     -1.380016    1.27363    -1.08   0.279    -3.879307    1.119276
       2007     -.3354203   1.296141    -0.26   0.796    -2.878885    2.208044
       2006     -.9000276   1.365474    -0.66   0.510    -3.579547    1.779491
       2005     -.7406935   1.426408    -0.52   0.604    -3.539786    2.058399
       2004      .1746038   1.481308     0.12   0.906    -2.732221    3.081429
       2003      .6575075   1.540944     0.43   0.670    -2.366344    3.681359
       2002      .4242271   1.612864     0.26   0.793    -2.740756     3.58921
       2001             0  (empty)
       2000             0  (empty)
       1999             0  (empty)
       1998             0  (empty)
       1997             0  (empty)
       1996             0  (empty)
        year  
              
         ssa     3.064629   1.605915     1.91   0.057    -.0867175    6.215976
        mena     3.377544    1.62332     2.08   0.038     .1920441    6.563044
        eeca    -15.09271   1.520736    -9.92   0.000    -18.07691   -12.10851
        csac    -2.424823   1.432408    -1.69   0.091    -5.235689    .3860438
        asia     5.455754   1.371547     3.98   0.000     2.764317    8.147191
       efrac    -.0649188   .0200586    -3.24   0.001    -.1042805    -.025557
       lfrac     .0635042   .0185765     3.42   0.001     .0270508    .0999576
       urban     .1872803   .0206491     9.07   0.000     .1467598    .2278008
       lnpop    -1.320102    .297876    -4.43   0.000    -1.904635   -.7355692
    lnenergy     .1322645   .1943622     0.68   0.496    -.2491395    .5136685
        cell     .0284166   .0131138     2.17   0.030     .0026829    .0541503
       phone     .5206648   .0307979    16.91   0.000      .460229    .5811007
       coast     .6871982   .9134658     0.75   0.452    -1.105329    2.479726
      precip     .0392393   .0613895     0.64   0.523    -.0812277    .1597062
       tmean    -.2285397   .0604635    -3.78   0.000    -.3471895   -.1098899
                                                                              
    ctrlcorr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     8.8021
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.7992
                                                  R-squared       =     0.8045
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000
                                                  F(  27,   1001) =     152.56
                                                  Number of obs   =       1029
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Regression II 
Second Stage 
 
 
 
                                                                                
       _cons     2.434334   .2961643     8.22   0.000     1.853863    3.014805
              
       2011             0  (omitted)
       2010      .0193993   .0491161     0.39   0.693    -.0768664     .115665
       2009      .0365289   .0497574     0.73   0.463    -.0609938    .1340515
       2008      .0964636   .0507028     1.90   0.057     -.002912    .1958393
       2007      .1444008   .0522061     2.77   0.006     .0420789    .2467228
       2006      .1984112   .0545711     3.64   0.000     .0914538    .3053687
       2005      .2549822   .0570614     4.47   0.000     .1431438    .3668205
       2004      .2882356   .0598303     4.82   0.000     .1709704    .4055009
       2003      .3018671   .0624549     4.83   0.000     .1794578    .4242764
       2002      .3146858   .0650829     4.84   0.000     .1871256     .442246
       2001             0  (empty)
       2000             0  (empty)
       1999             0  (empty)
       1998             0  (empty)
       1997             0  (empty)
       1996             0  (empty)
        year  
              
         ssa    -.1040587   .0636701    -1.63   0.102    -.2288498    .0207324
        mena     .4114864   .0605251     6.80   0.000     .2928593    .5301135
        eeca    -.4435279   .0899087    -4.93   0.000    -.6197457     -.26731
        csac    -.0585568   .0586824    -1.00   0.318    -.1735721    .0564585
        asia    -.4391132   .0533283    -8.23   0.000    -.5436348   -.3345916
       efrac     .0005142    .000857     0.60   0.548    -.0011655     .002194
       lfrac    -.0010358   .0007994    -1.30   0.195    -.0026026     .000531
       urban     .0018728   .0010856     1.73   0.084    -.0002549    .0040006
       lnpop     -.072939   .0133812    -5.45   0.000    -.0991658   -.0467123
    lnenergy     .0913925   .0077106    11.85   0.000       .07628     .106505
        cell     .0050883   .0005394     9.43   0.000      .004031    .0061456
       phone     .0095339   .0024521     3.89   0.000      .004728    .0143399
       coast       .12653   .0370131     3.42   0.001     .0539857    .1990743
      precip     .0092544   .0024868     3.72   0.000     .0043803    .0141285
       tmean     .0107338   .0026166     4.10   0.000     .0056054    .0158622
    ctrlcorr     .0261157   .0036548     7.15   0.000     .0189525     .033279
                                                                              
       lntfp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .35647
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8633
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000
                                                       Wald chi2(25) = 6500.77
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =    1029
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Regression III 
First Stage 
 
A two-stage least squares regression, with Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (cpi) and the Freedom House press index (fppress) as the instrument. 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     30.14883   5.489352     5.49   0.000     19.37992    40.91774
      lngold    -.3015742   .0735887    -4.10   0.000    -.4459392   -.1572092
   lndiamond     .3460823   .0696725     4.97   0.000        .2094    .4827646
     fppress     .2797067   .0239117    11.70   0.000     .2327972    .3266162
              
       2011             0  (omitted)
       2010      .2001182   1.479459     0.14   0.892    -2.702258    3.102494
       2009      .1185052    1.49198     0.08   0.937    -2.808435    3.045445
       2008      .8235426   1.515609     0.54   0.587    -2.149752    3.796837
       2007      1.017493   1.548176     0.66   0.511    -2.019691    4.054676
       2006      1.297413   1.609093     0.81   0.420    -1.859278    4.454103
       2005      1.679284   1.676266     1.00   0.317    -1.609185    4.967752
       2004      1.432406   1.744046     0.82   0.412    -1.989032    4.853844
       2003      2.010873   1.816956     1.11   0.269    -1.553598    5.575344
       2002      2.553645   1.900458     1.34   0.179    -1.174639    6.281928
       2001      2.408915   1.963432     1.23   0.220    -1.442912    6.260741
       2000      3.144777   2.042355     1.54   0.124    -.8618783    7.151433
       1999      4.114206   2.083125     1.98   0.048     .0275682    8.200844
       1998      5.209994     2.1757     2.39   0.017     .9417456    9.478243
       1997             0  (empty)
       1996             0  (empty)
        year  
              
         ssa     10.56967   1.707008     6.19   0.000     7.220894    13.91845
        mena     11.98056   1.778742     6.74   0.000     8.491055    15.47006
        eeca    -8.442224   1.809717    -4.66   0.000    -11.99249   -4.891955
        csac    -.5551192   1.523163    -0.36   0.716    -3.543233    2.432995
        asia     8.271328   1.462256     5.66   0.000       5.4027    11.13996
       efrac    -.0884154   .0214993    -4.11   0.000    -.1305924   -.0462385
       lfrac     .0790646   .0199985     3.95   0.000     .0398319    .1182973
       urban     .2097648   .0225743     9.29   0.000      .165479    .2540506
       lnpop    -2.171958    .330365    -6.57   0.000    -2.820062   -1.523854
    lnenergy      .407447   .2078321     1.96   0.050    -.0002743    .8151684
        cell     .0454374   .0147239     3.09   0.002     .0165524    .0743225
       phone     .5755788   .0335829    17.14   0.000     .5096965    .6414612
       coast     .7248071   .9410556     0.77   0.441    -1.121339    2.570953
      precip     .2212108     .06584     3.36   0.001      .092047    .3503745
       tmean    -.2945064   .0658159    -4.47   0.000    -.4236229     -.16539
                                                                              
         cpi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =    10.7424
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.7930
                                                  R-squared       =     0.7978
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000
                                                  F(  31,   1306) =     166.22
                                                  Number of obs   =       1338
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Regression III 
Second Stage 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     2.731972   .2182809    12.52   0.000     2.304149    3.159795
              
       2011             0  (omitted)
       2010      .0226344   .0507787     0.45   0.656      -.07689    .1221588
       2009      .0485874   .0512069     0.95   0.343    -.0517762     .148951
       2008      .1169997   .0520906     2.25   0.025      .014904    .2190954
       2007      .1827581    .053246     3.43   0.001     .0783978    .2871184
       2006      .2399651   .0553845     4.33   0.000     .1314135    .3485167
       2005      .3043765   .0578131     5.26   0.000     .1910649    .4176881
       2004      .3677052   .0600622     6.12   0.000     .2499854    .4854249
       2003      .4009283   .0627353     6.39   0.000     .2779694    .5238872
       2002      .3986028   .0657725     6.06   0.000      .269691    .5275146
       2001      .4184052   .0679312     6.16   0.000     .2852626    .5515479
       2000      .4317845   .0708086     6.10   0.000     .2930022    .5705668
       1999      .4893016   .0725371     6.75   0.000     .3471316    .6314717
       1998      .5440474   .0763096     7.13   0.000     .3944833    .6936115
       1997             0  (empty)
       1996             0  (empty)
        year  
              
         ssa    -.1703447   .0608546    -2.80   0.005    -.2896175   -.0510719
        mena     .3418085   .0551634     6.20   0.000     .2336903    .4499267
        eeca    -.5387845   .0696197    -7.74   0.000    -.6752366   -.4023323
        csac    -.0073485   .0522285    -0.14   0.888    -.1097144    .0950174
        asia    -.4348351   .0502017    -8.66   0.000    -.5332287   -.3364415
       efrac     .0014501   .0007979     1.82   0.069    -.0001138    .0030139
       lfrac    -.0013237    .000739    -1.79   0.073    -.0027721    .0001246
       urban     .0010348   .0009506     1.09   0.276    -.0008282    .0028979
       lnpop    -.0507773   .0127814    -3.97   0.000    -.0758283   -.0257263
    lnenergy     .0729815   .0070429    10.36   0.000     .0591778    .0867853
        cell     .0057645   .0005178    11.13   0.000     .0047496    .0067795
       phone     .0103887   .0020917     4.97   0.000     .0062891    .0144884
       coast     .0617195   .0323149     1.91   0.056    -.0016165    .1250554
      precip     .0060005   .0022783     2.63   0.008     .0015351     .010466
       tmean     .0127452   .0024351     5.23   0.000     .0079725    .0175178
         cpi     .0224906   .0025612     8.78   0.000     .0174708    .0275105
                                                                              
       lntfp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .36869
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8549
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000
                                                       Wald chi2(29) = 7981.93
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =    1338
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Regression IV 
First Stage 
 
A two-stage least squares regression, using Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (cpi) and the Freedom Press Index published by Reporters Without 
Borders (rsfpress) as the instrument. 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     33.83975   6.310085     5.36   0.000     21.45686    46.22264
      lngold     -.391844   .0815082    -4.81   0.000    -.5517954   -.2318925
   lndiamond     .2577327   .0809254     3.18   0.001     .0989249    .4165406
    rsfpress     .1743916   .0229896     7.59   0.000      .129277    .2195063
              
       2011             0  (omitted)
       2010     -1.291365   1.487188    -0.87   0.385     -4.20982     1.62709
       2009     -1.772595   1.513246    -1.17   0.242    -4.742186    1.196995
       2008     -1.484854   1.551533    -0.96   0.339    -4.529578     1.55987
       2007     -.6400641   1.578998    -0.41   0.685    -3.738686    2.458558
       2006     -1.167399   1.663961    -0.70   0.483    -4.432752    2.097954
       2005     -.7993046   1.740837    -0.46   0.646    -4.215519     2.61691
       2004     -.9483171   1.809642    -0.52   0.600    -4.499553    2.602919
       2003     -.8958837   1.894141    -0.47   0.636    -4.612942    2.821174
       2002     -.8717288   2.029899    -0.43   0.668    -4.855198    3.111741
       2001             0  (empty)
       2000             0  (empty)
       1999             0  (empty)
       1998             0  (empty)
       1997             0  (empty)
       1996             0  (empty)
        year  
              
         ssa     5.627823   1.973048     2.85   0.004     1.755917    9.499728
        mena     5.258136   1.991302     2.64   0.008     1.350409    9.165862
        eeca    -17.11743   1.870203    -9.15   0.000    -20.78751   -13.44735
        csac    -3.181438   1.753434    -1.81   0.070    -6.622372    .2594958
        asia     6.645018   1.699307     3.91   0.000     3.310301    9.979735
       efrac    -.1024122   .0245755    -4.17   0.000     -.150639   -.0541853
       lfrac     .0994881   .0227996     4.36   0.000     .0547463      .14423
       urban     .2436204   .0254239     9.58   0.000     .1937286    .2935121
       lnpop    -1.842335   .3680043    -5.01   0.000    -2.564506   -1.120164
    lnenergy     .3007058   .2388668     1.26   0.208    -.1680458    .7694575
        cell     .0261949   .0160339     1.63   0.103    -.0052699    .0576598
       phone     .6073076   .0377318    16.10   0.000     .5332628    .6813524
       coast     1.537147   1.117364     1.38   0.169    -.6555661     3.72986
      precip     .1521769   .0753198     2.02   0.044     .0043695    .2999844
       tmean     -.394314   .0747411    -5.28   0.000    -.5409858   -.2476421
                                                                              
         cpi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =    10.7183
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.7879
                                                  R-squared       =     0.7937
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000
                                                  F(  27,    976) =     139.03
                                                  Number of obs   =       1004
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Regression IV 
Second Stage 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     2.790529   .2717398    10.27   0.000     2.257928    3.323129
              
       2011             0  (omitted)
       2010      .0199441   .0506862     0.39   0.694    -.0793991    .1192873
       2009      .0448461   .0513421     0.87   0.382    -.0557827    .1454748
       2008       .103173   .0522654     1.97   0.048     .0007346    .2056114
       2007      .1569853   .0537495     2.92   0.003     .0516383    .2623323
       2006      .2118796   .0561986     3.77   0.000     .1017324    .3220267
       2005      .2698115   .0588896     4.58   0.000     .1543899     .385233
       2004      .3308214   .0614367     5.38   0.000     .2104077    .4512352
       2003      .3629041   .0641345     5.66   0.000     .2372028    .4886055
       2002      .3611739   .0686934     5.26   0.000     .2265373    .4958105
       2001             0  (empty)
       2000             0  (empty)
       1999             0  (empty)
       1998             0  (empty)
       1997             0  (empty)
       1996             0  (empty)
        year  
              
         ssa    -.1587823   .0691141    -2.30   0.022    -.2942435   -.0233211
        mena     .3505263   .0626428     5.60   0.000     .2277486     .473304
        eeca    -.4422784   .0939647    -4.71   0.000    -.6264458   -.2581109
        csac    -.0347397   .0610852    -0.57   0.570    -.1544646    .0849851
        asia    -.4612487   .0567198    -8.13   0.000    -.5724174   -.3500799
       efrac      .001382   .0009409     1.47   0.142    -.0004621    .0032262
       lfrac    -.0016535   .0008766    -1.89   0.059    -.0033716    .0000647
       urban     .0005478   .0012362     0.44   0.658    -.0018751    .0029707
       lnpop    -.0610657   .0148025    -4.13   0.000    -.0900781   -.0320533
    lnenergy     .0844275   .0080226    10.52   0.000     .0687035    .1001515
        cell     .0052746   .0005547     9.51   0.000     .0041874    .0063619
       phone     .0083301   .0027132     3.07   0.002     .0030124    .0136478
       coast     .1112707   .0385693     2.88   0.004     .0356763     .186865
      precip     .0062791   .0026433     2.38   0.018     .0010983      .01146
       tmean     .0134944    .002961     4.56   0.000     .0076911    .0192978
         cpi     .0244519   .0035475     6.89   0.000     .0174989    .0314049
                                                                              
       lntfp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .36786
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8518
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000
                                                       Wald chi2(25) = 5837.66
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =    1004
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Regression V 
First Stage 
 
A two-stage least squares regression, where an alternative measure of productivity (tfpalt) 
is used as the dependent variable.  The corruption variable is the World Governance 
Index’s control of corruption (ctrlcorr) and the Freedom House press index (fppress) 
instruments.   
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     41.49687   3.432169    12.09   0.000     34.76503    48.22872
      lngold    -.1821853   .0523052    -3.48   0.001    -.2847765   -.0795941
   lndiamond     .2479455   .0492414     5.04   0.000     .1513635    .3445275
     fppress     .3067728   .0161763    18.96   0.000     .2750446     .338501
              
       2011     -6.764964   1.581344    -4.28   0.000    -9.866608   -3.663321
       2010     -6.519798   1.531085    -4.26   0.000    -9.522863   -3.516733
       2009     -6.293341   1.479864    -4.25   0.000    -9.195941   -3.390741
       2008     -5.580282    1.43129    -3.90   0.000     -8.38761   -2.772954
       2007     -5.256962   1.372963    -3.83   0.000    -7.949887   -2.564038
       2006     -5.043238   1.315106    -3.83   0.000    -7.622683   -2.463793
       2005     -4.848387   1.262851    -3.84   0.000     -7.32534   -2.371435
       2004     -3.976292   1.227856    -3.24   0.001    -6.384605   -1.567978
       2003     -3.070542   1.207047    -2.54   0.011     -5.43804   -.7030443
       2002     -3.239593   1.193804    -2.71   0.007    -5.581117   -.8980696
       2001     -3.211582    1.18192    -2.72   0.007    -5.529796   -.8933687
       2000      -2.36897   1.170082    -2.02   0.043    -4.663965    -.073975
       1999     -1.248123   1.166598    -1.07   0.285    -3.536284    1.040038
       1998     -.5307221   1.162352    -0.46   0.648    -2.810556    1.749111
       1997     -.2696248   1.163965    -0.23   0.817    -2.552621    2.013372
        year  
              
         ssa     7.361554   1.188712     6.19   0.000     5.030017     9.69309
        mena     10.70632   1.227848     8.72   0.000     8.298022    13.11462
        eeca    -5.105467   1.236508    -4.13   0.000     -7.53075   -2.680183
        csac     -.121174   1.065347    -0.11   0.909    -2.210743    1.968395
        asia     7.303675   .9963307     7.33   0.000     5.349475    9.257875
       efrac    -.0526751   .0150537    -3.50   0.000    -.0822013   -.0231489
       lfrac     .0406084   .0138578     2.93   0.003     .0134277     .067789
       urban     .1096815   .0152906     7.17   0.000     .0796906    .1396723
       lnpop    -1.343867   .2113022    -6.36   0.000    -1.758315   -.9294198
    lnenergy     .2972991   .1341697     2.22   0.027     .0341391     .560459
        cell      .051966   .0105283     4.94   0.000     .0313159    .0726161
       phone     .5031079   .0236314    21.29   0.000     .4567575    .5494584
       coast    -.5147894   .6693546    -0.77   0.442    -1.827659    .7980805
      precip     .1457077   .0460581     3.16   0.002     .0553695    .2360458
       tmean    -.1293056   .0453632    -2.85   0.004    -.2182808   -.0403305
                                                                              
    ctrlcorr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     8.3901
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.8178
                                                  R-squared       =     0.8214
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000
                                                  F(  33,   1657) =     230.86
                                                  Number of obs   =       1691
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Regression V 
Second Stage 
 
 
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     3.390893   .1982102    17.11   0.000     3.002408    3.779378
              
       2011     -.5166118    .072661    -7.11   0.000    -.6590248   -.3741988
       2010     -.5004691    .070342    -7.11   0.000    -.6383368   -.3626014
       2009     -.4867773   .0679848    -7.16   0.000     -.620025   -.3535296
       2008     -.4156214   .0653838    -6.36   0.000    -.5437714   -.2874715
       2007     -.3610241   .0626213    -5.77   0.000    -.4837597   -.2382885
       2006     -.3132911    .059955    -5.23   0.000    -.4308008   -.1957815
       2005     -.2573818   .0574748    -4.48   0.000    -.3700303   -.1447332
       2004     -.2273986    .055542    -4.09   0.000    -.3362588   -.1185384
       2003      -.210211   .0542228    -3.88   0.000    -.3164857   -.1039362
       2002     -.1775381   .0537016    -3.31   0.001    -.2827913   -.0722849
       2001     -.1577612   .0530515    -2.97   0.003    -.2617401   -.0537822
       2000     -.1223998   .0523353    -2.34   0.019     -.224975   -.0198246
       1999     -.0941188   .0519409    -1.81   0.070     -.195921    .0076834
       1998     -.0544747   .0516514    -1.05   0.292    -.1557096    .0467602
       1997     -.0240506   .0516938    -0.47   0.642    -.1253686    .0772674
        year  
              
         ssa    -.1544307   .0520841    -2.97   0.003    -.2565138   -.0523477
        mena     .3971272   .0490638     8.09   0.000     .3009638    .4932905
        eeca    -.6328035   .0588643   -10.75   0.000    -.7481755   -.5174316
        csac    -.0644188   .0472915    -1.36   0.173    -.1571084    .0282708
        asia    -.3634368   .0440777    -8.25   0.000    -.4498276   -.2770461
       efrac     .0009316   .0006875     1.35   0.175    -.0004159    .0022792
       lfrac    -.0011105   .0006309    -1.76   0.078    -.0023471     .000126
       urban     .0054428    .000721     7.55   0.000     .0040296     .006856
       lnpop    -.1155911   .0096424   -11.99   0.000    -.1344898   -.0966924
    lnenergy     .0983195   .0058569    16.79   0.000     .0868402    .1097988
        cell      .005025   .0004844    10.37   0.000     .0040755    .0059745
       phone     .0150972   .0017354     8.70   0.000     .0116958    .0184986
       coast     .1004856   .0297015     3.38   0.001     .0422718    .1586994
      precip     .0071413   .0020241     3.53   0.000     .0031741    .0111085
       tmean     .0143379   .0020454     7.01   0.000     .0103289    .0183469
    ctrlcorr     .0207678    .002231     9.31   0.000      .016395    .0251405
                                                                              
    lntfpalt        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   .3726
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8726
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000
                                                       Wald chi2(31) =11575.07
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =    1691
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Regression VI 
First Stage  
 
A two-stage least squares regression, with the World Governance Index’s control of 
corruption variable (ctrlcorr) and the Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press (fppress) as 
the instrument.  Measures of tfp and energy are replaced with per capita measures. 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     41.49687   3.432169    12.09   0.000     34.76503    48.22872
      lngold    -.1821853   .0523052    -3.48   0.001    -.2847765    -.079594
   lndiamond     .2479455   .0492414     5.04   0.000     .1513635    .3445275
     fppress     .3067728   .0161763    18.96   0.000     .2750446     .338501
              
       2011     -6.764964   1.581344    -4.28   0.000    -9.866608   -3.663321
       2010     -6.519798   1.531085    -4.26   0.000    -9.522863   -3.516733
       2009     -6.293341   1.479864    -4.25   0.000    -9.195941   -3.390741
       2008     -5.580282    1.43129    -3.90   0.000     -8.38761   -2.772954
       2007     -5.256962   1.372963    -3.83   0.000    -7.949887   -2.564038
       2006     -5.043238   1.315106    -3.83   0.000    -7.622683   -2.463793
       2005     -4.848387   1.262851    -3.84   0.000     -7.32534   -2.371435
       2004     -3.976292   1.227856    -3.24   0.001    -6.384605   -1.567978
       2003     -3.070542   1.207047    -2.54   0.011     -5.43804   -.7030442
       2002     -3.239593   1.193804    -2.71   0.007    -5.581117   -.8980696
       2001     -3.211582    1.18192    -2.72   0.007    -5.529796   -.8933687
       2000      -2.36897   1.170082    -2.02   0.043    -4.663965    -.073975
       1999     -1.248123   1.166598    -1.07   0.285    -3.536284    1.040038
       1998     -.5307221   1.162352    -0.46   0.648    -2.810556    1.749111
       1997     -.2696248   1.163965    -0.23   0.817    -2.552621    2.013372
        year  
              
         ssa     7.361554   1.188712     6.19   0.000     5.030017     9.69309
        mena     10.70632   1.227848     8.72   0.000     8.298022    13.11462
        eeca    -5.105467   1.236508    -4.13   0.000     -7.53075   -2.680183
        csac    -.1211741   1.065347    -0.11   0.909    -2.210743    1.968395
        asia     7.303675   .9963307     7.33   0.000     5.349475    9.257875
       efrac    -.0526751   .0150537    -3.50   0.000    -.0822013   -.0231489
       lfrac     .0406084   .0138578     2.93   0.003     .0134277     .067789
       urban     .1096815   .0152906     7.17   0.000     .0796906    .1396723
       lnpop    -1.046568   .1638053    -6.39   0.000    -1.367855   -.7252811
  lnenergypc      .297299   .1341697     2.22   0.027     .0341391     .560459
        cell      .051966   .0105283     4.94   0.000     .0313159    .0726161
       phone     .5031079   .0236314    21.29   0.000     .4567575    .5494584
       coast    -.5147894   .6693546    -0.77   0.442    -1.827659    .7980805
      precip     .1457077   .0460581     3.16   0.002     .0553695    .2360458
       tmean    -.1293056   .0453632    -2.85   0.004    -.2182808   -.0403305
                                                                              
    ctrlcorr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     8.3901
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.8178
                                                  R-squared       =     0.8214
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000
                                                  F(  33,   1657) =     230.86
                                                  Number of obs   =       1691
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Regression VI 
Second Stage  
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     3.609641   .1931256    18.69   0.000     3.231121     3.98816
              
       2011      -.504944   .0707971    -7.13   0.000    -.6437038   -.3661842
       2010     -.4893532   .0685375    -7.14   0.000    -.6236843   -.3550222
       2009     -.4773707   .0662408    -7.21   0.000    -.6072003   -.3475412
       2008     -.4084816   .0637066    -6.41   0.000    -.5333442   -.2836191
       2007     -.3547302   .0610149    -5.81   0.000    -.4743173   -.2351431
       2006     -.3082084    .058417    -5.28   0.000    -.4227037   -.1937132
       2005     -.2520124   .0560004    -4.50   0.000    -.3617713   -.1422536
       2004     -.2204961   .0541172    -4.07   0.000    -.3265638   -.1144284
       2003     -.2017425   .0528319    -3.82   0.000    -.3052911    -.098194
       2002     -.1695335    .052324    -3.24   0.001    -.2720866   -.0669803
       2001     -.1508128   .0516905    -2.92   0.004    -.2521244   -.0495012
       2000     -.1167801   .0509927    -2.29   0.022     -.216724   -.0168361
       1999     -.0902315   .0506084    -1.78   0.075    -.1894222    .0089592
       1998     -.0522298   .0503264    -1.04   0.299    -.1508678    .0464082
       1997     -.0229613   .0503677    -0.46   0.648    -.1216803    .0757577
        year  
              
         ssa    -.1105427    .050748    -2.18   0.029     -.210007   -.0110783
        mena     .4163285   .0478052     8.71   0.000     .3226319     .510025
        eeca    -.6461308   .0573543   -11.27   0.000    -.7585431   -.5337184
        csac    -.0439339   .0460783    -0.95   0.340    -.1342458    .0463779
        asia    -.3671821    .042947    -8.55   0.000    -.4513567   -.2830075
       efrac     .0007223   .0006699     1.08   0.281    -.0005907    .0020353
       lfrac    -.0008552   .0006147    -1.39   0.164    -.0020601    .0003496
       urban     .0044942   .0007025     6.40   0.000     .0031172    .0058711
       lnpop    -1.015103   .0071034  -142.90   0.000    -1.029026   -1.001181
  lnenergypc     .0944116   .0057066    16.54   0.000     .0832268    .1055964
        cell     .0047144    .000472     9.99   0.000     .0037893    .0056395
       phone     .0149557   .0016909     8.84   0.000     .0116415    .0182698
       coast     .0954132   .0289396     3.30   0.001     .0386927    .1521337
      precip     .0081592   .0019722     4.14   0.000     .0042937    .0120246
       tmean     .0136469    .001993     6.85   0.000     .0097408    .0175531
    ctrlcorr     .0196031   .0021738     9.02   0.000     .0153425    .0238637
                                                                              
     lntfppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .36305
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9699
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000
                                                       Wald chi2(31) =54459.36
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =    1691
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